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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters. In the rst chapter, The choice to become
self-employed: acknowledging frictions, I develop and calibrate a search model of self-
employment that is quantitatively consistent with the unemployment, paid employment
and self-employment rates, the transitions between those states and the observed dis-
tribution of earnings in self-employment and paid employment. I rst report evidence
indicating that many individuals choose self-employment as a route out of unemployment.
Using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP; Eurostat), I nd
that the proportion of unemployed entering self-employment is higher that the proportion
of paid employed entering self-employment. Then I nd that the earnings of the self-
employed coming from unemployment are lower than the earnings of the paid employed
coming from unemployment. Moreover, I nd that the self-employed coming from un-
employment earn less than those coming from paid employment. This evidence cannot
be captured by existing theoretical models of self-employment that assume a perfectly
competitive environment in the labor market and ignore market frictions such as unem-
ployment. I construct a model of self-employment where I allow for on-the-job search
in both paid employment and self-employment. Workers receive job o¤ers from a wage
distribution and business ideas from an income distribution. The model captures the fact
that the self-employed earn less in median and in mean than the paid employed and that
the distribution of self-employment earnings exhibits greater variation. Unemployed indi-
viduals choose self-employment with associated low incomes because their option values in
self-employment are better than those in unemployment. Self-employment is a transitory
state for these workers who see in self-employment a door to paid employment. The model
is then used to analyze the e¤ects of some policies that encourage self-employment.
In the second chapter, How does employment protection legislation inuence hiring
and ring decisions by the smallest rms? (joint with J.M. Millán, C. Román and A.
van Stel), we examine the impact of employment protection legislation (EPL) on hiring
decisions by own-account workers and ring decisions by very small rms (1-4 employees).
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Using data from the EU-15 countries, our results show that the strictness of employment
protection legislation is negatively related to both these types of decisions, and hence, to
labor mobility among the smallest rms. This new evidence may be useful for governments
aiming to create a more enabling macro-environment for employment and productivity
growth.
Finally, in the third chapter Unraveling the relationship between the business cycle
and the own-account workers decision to hire employees (joint with J.M. Millán, C.
Román and A. van Stel), We study the role of the business cycle in the individual decision
of own-account workers to hire employees. Using panel data from the European Commu-
nity Household Panel for the EU-15 countries, we show that own-account workers are less
likely to hire employees during recessions. Next, we focus on identifying the underlying
mechanisms of this negative relationship, while bearing in mind that liquidity constraints
and unemployment are more common during recessions. First, we observe how liquidity
constraints reduce the probability of transitioning from own-account worker to employer.
Second, we nd that non-higher educated own-account workers who were formerly unem-
ployed are less likely to take on employees compared to those who were formerly in paid
employment. This lower likelihood does however not seem to apply to formerly unem-
ployed own-account workers who enjoyed tertiary education. These results suggest that
formal education and former work experience are important assets for own-account work-
ers which increase the probability that they create new jobs. This new evidence may be
useful for governments aiming to stimulate employment growth.
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Resumen
Mi tesis consta de tres capítulos. En el primer capítulo, The choice to become self-
employed: acknowledging frictions, elaboro y calibro un modelo de búsqueda con autoem-
pleo que es consistente cuantitativamente con las tasas de desempleo, empleo asalariado
y autoempleo, las probabilidades de transición entre estos estados y las distribuciones de
ganancias en el autoempleo y el empleo asalariado. Primero reporto evidencia que in-
dica que un gran número de individuos elige el autoempleo como una vía de escape al
desempleo. Usando datos del Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea (ECHP; Eurostat),
hallo que los desempleados son más propensos que los empleados asalariados a entrar en el
autoempleo. También hallo que las rentas de los autoempleados que vienen del desempleo
son menores que las rentas de los empleados asalariados que vienen del desempleo. Es más,
los autoempleados que provienen del desempleo ganan menos que aquellos que provienen
del empleo asalariado. Los modelos teóricos de autoempleo que asumen un entorno per-
fectamente competitivo en el mercado laboral e ignoran la existencia de fricciones como es
el caso del desempleo, no son capaces de capturar esta evidencia. Construyo un modelo de
autoempleo donde permito búsqueda de empleo mientras se está trabajando tanto en el
empleo asalariado como en el autoempleo. Los trabajadores reciben ofertas de trabajo e
ideas de negocios. El modelo captura el hecho de que los autoempleados ganan menos en
media y en mediana que los empleados asalariados y que la distribución de ganancias de
los autoempleados presenta una varianza mayor. Los desempleados eligen el autoempleo
aunque sus ingresos sean bajos porque sus alternativas en el autoempleo son mejores que
en el desempleo. El autoempleo es un estado transitorio para aquellos trabajadores que
lo consideran como una entrada al empleo asalariado. Después, el modelo se usa para
analizar el efecto de algunas políticas que promueven el autoempleo.
En el Segundo capítulo, How does employment protection legislation inuence hiring
and ring decisions by the smallest rms? (junto con J.M. Millán, C. Román and A. van
Stel), examinamos el impacto de la legislación de protección al empleo sobre las decisiones
de contratación por parte de los autónomos y las decisiones de despido por parte de las
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pequeñas empresas (1-4 trabajadores). Usando datos de los países de la EU-15, nuestros
resultados muestran que la rigurosidad de de la legislación de protección al empleo está
relacionada negativamente con ambos tipos de decisiones, y por tanto, con la movilidad
laboral entre las empresas más pequeñas. Esta nueva evidencia podría ser útil para los
gobiernos que pretenden crear un entorno macroeconómico para el empleo y el crecimiento
de la productividad.
Finalmente, en el tercer capítulo Unraveling the relationship between the business cy-
cle and the own-account workers decision to hire employees (junto con J.M. Millán, C.
Román and A. van Stel), estudiamos el papel del ciclo economico en la decisión individual
por parte de los autónomos de contratar trabajadores. Usando datos de los países de
la EU-15, mostramos que los autónomos son menos propensos a contratar trabajadores
durante las recesiones. A continuación, nos centramos en identicar los mecanismos sub-
yacentes a esta relación negativa, mientras tenemos en cuenta que las restricciones de
liquidez y el desempleo son más comunes durante los periodos de recesión. Primero obser-
vamos cómo las restricciones de liquidez reducen la probabilidad de transitar de autónomo
a empleador. Segundo, hallamos que los autónomos que no possen educación superior y
que previamente fueron desempleados son menos propensos a contratar trabajadores que
aquellos que previamente fueron empleados asalariados. Sin embargo, esta menor proba-
bilidad no parece ser aplicable a los autónomos previamente desempleados con educación
terciaria. Estos resultados sugieren que la educación formal y la experiencia laboral previa
son recursos importantes para los autónomos ya que incrementan la probabilidad de que
creen nuevos puestos de trabajo. Esta nueva evidencia podría ser útil para los gobiernos
que pretenden estimular el crecimiento del empleo.
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Chapter 1
The Choice to Become
Self-employed: Acknowledging
Frictions
Abstract. Using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP; Eu-
rostat), I develop and calibrate a search model of self-employment that is quantitatively
consistent with the unemployment, paid employment and self-employment rates, the tran-
sitions between those states and the observed distribution of earnings in self-employment
and paid employment. I rst report evidence indicating that many individuals choose
self-employment as a route out of unemployment. This evidence cannot be captured
by existing theoretical models of self-employment that assume a perfectly competitive
environment in the labor market and ignore, by denition, market frictions such as un-
employment. I construct a model of self-employment where I allow for on-the-job search
in both paid employment and self-employment. Workers receive job o¤ers from a wage
distribution and business ideas from an income distribution. The model captures the fact
that the self-employed earn less in median and in mean than the paid employed and that
the distribution of self-employment earnings exhibits greater variation. Unemployed indi-
viduals choose self-employment with associated low incomes because their option values in
self-employment are better than those in unemployment. Self-employment is a transitory
state for these workers who see in self-employment a door to paid employment. The model
is then used to analyze the e¤ects of some policies that encourage self-employment.
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1.1 Introduction
The self-employed are usually classied formally as individuals who earn no regular
wage or salary but who derive their income by exercising their profession or business
on their own account and at their own risk (Parker, 2009; pp. 11). Self-employment
is an important source of employment in developed countries. Around 15 per cent
of the workforce in most OECD economies are self-employed (see OECD, Labour
Force Statistics).
The common view of the self-employed is remarkably positive in both the
public opinion and the literature. They are thought to be creative and highly qual-
ied individuals who have abandoned the comfort of salaried positions to invent
new products, production processes, and distribution methods. Thus, self-employed
workers are generally regarded as successful entrepreneurs generating high revenues,
creating employment opportunities and encouraging technological progress (Acs,
2008; Carree and Thurik, 2008; Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Thurik et
al., 2008). Policy reports also place special emphasis on entrepreneurship (see, for
instance the new Europe 2020 strategy, the EUs growth strategy for the coming
decade).
However, there are some puzzles regarding the choice to become self-employed.
There is evidence that the self-employed are not well remunerated relative to the
paid employed (evidence for the US is available in Carrington et al., 1996; Hamilton,
2000; and Kawaguchi, 2002). Using US data from the 1984 SIPP (Survey of Income
and Program Participation), Hamilton (2000) estimated that (i) the self-employed
earn less in median than the paid employed; (ii) relatively large proportions of the
self-employed are concentrated in the lower and the upper tails of the overall income
distribution compared with the paid employed (see also Goodman and Webb, 1994;
for US evidence and Meager et al., 1994, 1996 for UK evidence); and (iii) assuming
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an absence of market frictions in the model (such as unemployment), on average,
all individuals except those in the upper quartile of the self-employment income dis-
tribution would have earned more, and enjoyed higher future income growth rates,
if they had switched into paid employment.1 Furthermore, based on US data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Flow of Funds Accounts and the
National Income and Product Accounts (FFA/NIPA) over the period 1989 to 1998,
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) suggest that self-employment is, on aver-
age, unprotable: returns to capital are too low and risk is too high compared to
investment in public equity.
Popular explanations to these puzzles are that being self-employed gives
substantial non-pecuniary benets (Hamilton, 2000; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011) or
that the self-employed are overcondent, i.e., the self-employed think they will do
better than they actually do (De Meza and Southey, 1996). Thus, some individu-
als might voluntarilyenter self-employment for reasons such as independence, job
satisfaction and/or anticipated higher incomes. On the contrary, self-employment
may constitute a far less desirable state chosen reluctantly by individuals unable
to nd a job in paid employment under the prevailing labor market conditions.
Thus, Evans and Leighton (1989) and Carrasco (1999) examine the e¤ect of be-
ing unemployed on the decision to become self-employed. Evans and Leighton use
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSYM; 1966-1981)
for the US whereas Carrascos work is based on the Household Budget Continuous
Survey (ECPF; 1985-1991) for Spain. They nd that unemployment increases the
likelihood of entering self-employment. Finally, based on the Working and Living
1Net prot which is the standard measure reported in data sets, is generally an accounting prot that
may be used as the basis for the calculation of net income for tax purposes and is therefore thought to
understate the true prots of business owners. To deal with the potential underreporting problem by
the self-employed, Hamilton constructs alternative measures of self-employment earnings. He uses two
alternative measures, the draw (i.e. amount withdrawn in the form of salary by the entrepreneur) and the
equity-adjusted draw, which is the sum of the draw in period t and the change in business equity between
the beginning of period t and period t+ 1.
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Conditions Survey (ECVT; 1985) for Spain and the DisplacedWorker Survey (DWS;
1984, 1986 and 1988) for the US, Alba-Ramirez (1994) nd that the duration of un-
employment increases the probability of becoming self-employed. Therefore, some
individuals might be pushedinto self-employed as the only available route out of
unemployment.
In this sense, we observe a growth of (mainly empirical) works devoted to the
analysis of the determinants of the decision to become self-employed (see Parkers
2009 handbook for a recent review). The number of theoretical contributions on
this, however, has been rather low to date (see works by Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic,
1994; and Rissman, 2003, 2007 as notable exceptions), and have certain limitations.
My goals in this paper are threefold. First, on the basis of data drawn from
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP; Eurostat), I document some
empirical facts on earnings from self and paid employment and transitions to self-
employment from both paid employment and unemployment. Among other regular-
ities, I report that (i) unemployed workers are more likely to enter self-employment
than paid employed workers are; (ii) the self-employment sector does not pay well,
on average, as compared to the paid employment sector (the self-employed earn less
in mean and median relative to the paid employed; and self-employment incomes
are more unequal than paid employed); and (iii) those entering self-employment
from unemployment have lower earnings than those entering self-employment from
paid employment. This gives support to the view of self-employment as the only
available alternative to unemployment for certain groups.
The second goal of the paper (and the most important contribution) is to
develop and calibrate a model that acknowledges frictions and can jointly repli-
cate the empirical evidence about earnings and transition chances to and from self-
employment discussed above.
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This model is an extension of the standard search model of unemployment
originally due to McCall (1970) where I allow for self-employment and on-the-job
search on both paid employment and self-employment. In the model, individuals
(either paid employed, self-employed or unemployed) receive job o¤ers from a given
wage distribution. Workers also receive business ideas. Those ideas are associated
with a self-employment income which is drawn from an income distribution. Both
job o¤ers and ideas arrive at a di¤erent rate for unemployed, paid employed and
self-employed workers.
The calibrated model is able to reproduce well transitions between unem-
ployment, paid employment and self-employment, and income distributions as ob-
served in the data. It also does a good job in capturing the unemployment, paid
employment and self-employment rates. The model is also useful to understand
individual self-employment choices and heterogeneity. In this sense, we divide the
self-employed into two groups: those with earnings lower than the median paid em-
ployed and those with earnings higher than the median paid employed. The model
predicts that the transition pattern of those two groups is quite di¤erent and that
low income self-employment is a less stablegroup. In particular, the majority of
the transitions from unemployment to self-employment are to lower income self-
employment, which is also supported by the data. Moreover, most of the transitions
from self-employment to paid employment come from the group of the lower income
self-employed, which is consistent with the data as well. Unemployed workers choose
self-employment despite the corresponding low income because their option values
in self-employment are better than those in unemployment. Therefore, they nd in
self-employment a good route to nd a paid employment job.
Finally, the model is used to evaluate the economic and societal benets of
public policies encouraging self-employment (i.e. start-up incentives) which is the
third and last goal of the paper. The results show that those policy beneciaries
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would have entered self-employment even without the start-ups incentives. As a
consequence, those policies have small e¤ects on the transitions from unemployment
to self-employment, leaving the self-employment and unemployment rates practically
unchanged.
Existing attempts to develop theoretical models trying to explain self-employment
choice typically assume a perfectly competitive environment in the labor market
(i.e. Walrasian models) in which workers choose between paid employment and
self-employment (Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1994). In consequence, the existing mod-
els ignore market frictions such as unemployment, by denition. Further, in these
models workers enter self-employment if and only if they get higher revenues in this
state than in paid employment. Hence, these analyses cannot capture the fact that
the self-employed earn less in mean and median than the paid employed.
To the best of my knowledge, the use of search models including the possi-
bility of being self-employed is only available in papers by Rissman (2003 & 2007)
and Narita (2011). As an advantage, their approach also allow for the state of
unemployment. However, a contribution of my approach is that, unlike Rissman
(2003 & 2007), I am able to explain the earnings puzzle. Also, I do not restrict
workers transition behavior. In Rissman (2003) self-employment o¤ers low and
xed earnings and by assumption, it is considered as an inferior state compared to
paid employment. Hence the transitions from paid employment to self-employment
are excluded from her framework. Concerning Rissman (2007), her work focuses
on modeling the transitions among the three labor market states of unemployment,
paid employment, and self-employment. In her model, and unlike mine, the paid
employed are not allowed to search on the job, and the arrival rates of business ideas
and job o¤ers are the same for all workers (they do not depend on their employ-
ment state). As an advantage, my model explains the earnings puzzle. Further, my
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model also allows to match the transitions between unemployment, paid employ-
ment and self-employment states and the corresponding rates (whereas Rissmans
model overstates the transition from paid employment into self-employment and
understates the transition from self-employment into paid employment, leading to a
self-employment rate which is too high and a paid employment rate which is too low
relative to what is observed in the data). Narita (2011) develops a life cycle search
model which accounts the three main categories of employment of a developing econ-
omy: formal wage earners, informal wage earners and self-employed. She nds that
the model reproduces well the composition of workers over the life cycle as observed
in Brazilian data. She analyzes the welfare implications of policies which attempt
reducing informality nding that, when job o¤ers from informal sector rms become
inexistent to those unemployed, most of informal sector wage earners become self-
employed, having small e¤ects on unemployment, while workers welfare does not
increase either. In this paper, I abstract from informality to characterize the envi-
ronment in Europe. In her model, individuals can only move into self employment
from unemployment and not from searching on the job. In contrast, I also allow for
individuals entering self-employment from paid employment which is important to
explain workers outside options and their employment choices. While her model
estimates of the mobility rates from self-employment to (formal) paid employment
are very low in general, they are relatively high in my model where many workers
enter paid employment from self-employment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 focuses on
documenting empirical facts on European data. Section 1.3 describes the model,
and Section 1.4 calibrates it. Section 1.5 presents the main quantitative results and
Section 1.6 focuses on the policy analysis. Finally, the concluding remarks of the
study are put forth in Section 1.7.
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1.2 Empirical facts on European data
This section describes some empirical regularities about earnings and transition rates
to and from self-employment using European data, which will serve as the empirical
reference to be replicated by the later development and calibration of my model. In
particular, I use data from the ECHP which is a standardized multi-purpose annual
longitudinal survey carried out at the level of the EU-15. It is designed and coor-
dinated by the Statistical O¢ ce of the European Communities (EUROSTAT). The
target population of the ECHP consists of people living in private households in
the national territory of each country. This panel o¤ers information on 60,500 na-
tionally representative households, which include approximately 130,000 individuals
aged 16 years and older. One of its attractive features is the high level of com-
parability across countries and over time. Thus, using the same questionnaire, all
members of the selected households in the participating countries are interviewed
about issues relating to demographics, labor market characteristics, income, and
living conditions. Additional details on the ECHP data can be found in Peracchi
(2002).
I restrict my sample to males between the ages of 25 and 59 who report
being unemployed, paid employed or self-employed.2 By doing so, I exclude from
my analysis the potential distorting e¤ects of incorporating relatively less stable
groups within the labour force. In particular, compared with individuals within the
25-59 age band, those younger individuals are more likely to be enrolled in education
whereas elder individuals are more likely to be retired. For the paid employed and
self-employed sample, I also exclude those individuals who work part-time (less than
2 Individuals can also self-classify themselves in the following categories: (i) working with an employer in
paid apprenticeship; (ii) working with an employer in training under special schemes related to employment;
(iii) unpaid work in a family enterprise; (iv) in education or training; (v) retired; (vi) doing housework,
looking after children or other persons; (vii) in community or military service; and (viii) other economically
inactive.
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25 hours per week) and those who work in the agricultural sector.3
Table 1.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of individuals by employment
status. On average, and compared with paid employed individuals, self-employed
(i) are 2.1 years older; (ii) present lower levels of educational attainment; (iii) work
about 10 hours more per week; and (iv) are more likely to work in the construction
and services sectors, and less likely to work in the industrial sector.
Table 1.1. Descriptive statistics
Status UN PE SE
(n=19,163) (n=170,461) (n=33,254)
Age (years) 39.7 40.1 42.2
(10.8) (9.3) (9.1)
Recognised third level education (ISCED 5-7) 13.5% 24.9% 21.8%
Second stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3) 31.6% 37.1% 31.1%
Less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2) 54.9% 38.0% 47.1%
# of hours working per week  42.4 52.5
 (7.3) (12.6)
Working in the industrial sector a  30,8% 16,4%
Working in the construction sector b  12,0% 21,5%
Working in the services sector c  57,3% 62,2%
Notes:
(i) standard deviations for continuous explanatory variables in parentheses
(ii) a NACE-93 codes C, D and E; b NACE-93 code F; c NACE-93 codes G to Q
The transition probabilities between the states of unemployment, paid em-
ployment and self-employment for the entire sample are shown in Table 1.2. From
this table, it can be observed how unemployed workers look more likely to en-
ter self-employment than paid employed workers. Thus, some individuals might
3Sweden has to be excluded from my analysis because this country presents missing values for relevant
variables in the analysis.
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see in self-employment a route out of unemployment, in the absence of wage work
opportunities. Further, the relatively high chances of entering paid employment
from self-employment may indicate that some workers consider self-employment as
a stepping-stone to paid employment.
Table 1.2. Transition probabilities (in %)
Status in t+1
Status in t UN PE SE
UN 65:3 30:1 4:6
PE 2:4 96:2 1:4
SE 1:3 6:7 92:0
The same transition probabilities are shown in Table 1.3 for selected groups of
countries: Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, Continental and Mediterranean.4 As expected,
some di¤erences emerge for these groups. These rates, however, follow the similar
patterns to those observed for the entire sample.
Table 1.3. Transition probabilities for group of countries (in %)
Nordic Anglo-Saxon Continental Mediterranean
Status in t+1 Status in t+1 Status in t+1 Status in t+1
Status in t UN PE SE UN PE SE UN PE SE UN PE SE
UN 62.11 35.84 2.05 71.63 22.77 4.60 70.18 29.82 2.18 62.69 30.53 6.78
PE 1.66 96.90 1.44 1.71 96.75 1.54 2.42 96.94 0.64 3.05 94.46 2.49
SE 1.00 10.41 88.58 0.96 7.55 91.49 0.87 4.84 94.29 1.57 6.58 91.85
Table 1.4 reports information on annual earnings for self-employed and paid
employed workers.5 From this information it can be checked whether the stylized
facts about the particular distribution of earnings among both groups described in
4Sapir (2005) sees the European countries as falling into this four categories.
5 In order to create comparable incomes for both groups, two lters have been applied to the subsample
of paid and self-employed individuals included in Table 1. First, we excluded all individuals that reported
earnings equal to 0 (which primarily a¤ected the group of self-employed individuals). Second, in order to
strictly present yearly incomes, we restricted our sample to the group of individuals that declared being
either paid or self-employed from January to December during period t  1.
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the previous section are conrmed by this data. In particular, I am interested in
comparing earnings of both self and paid employed and test whether (i) the self-
employed earn less in mean and/or in median relative to the paid employees; and
(ii) self-employment incomes are more unequal than paid employed. In this vein,
both facts are conrmed by the descriptive statistics. This comparison suggests that
the self-employment sector does not pay well, on average, as compared to the paid
employment sector.
Table 1.4. Annual earnings of paid and self-employed workers
Status PE SE Income di¤erences
(n = 153,097) (n = 27,700) between SE and PE (%)
Mean (st. dev.) 18,252 17,469 -4,3%
(11,326) (29,994)
Percentiles
10% 9,394 4,093 -56,4%
25% 12,487 8,174 -34,5%
50% 16,118 13,156 -18,4%
75% 21,148 20,004 -5,4%
90% 28,767 31,717 10,3%
95% 35,271 45,077 27,8%
99% 54,902 88,687 61,5%
Note: Net annual Incomes earned either as paid or self-employed during period t-1, converted to
average e of 1996, being corrected by purchasing power parity (across countries) and harmonised
consumer price index (across time).
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Table 1.4 only o¤ers a descriptive comparison without taking into account
the role of some well known predictors of earnings. In order to correct this limita-
tion I estimate earnings equations to compare earnings for self and paid employed
individuals where some demographic information as well as business sector, country
and time dummies are included in the regressions. Given the skewness observed in
the data, quantile regressions are used.6 These results are presented in Table 1.5.
In coherence with that obtained in the descriptive analysis, these results
show how self-employment earnings are lower than paid employment ones at 0.1,
0.25 and 0.5 percentiles and higher at percentiles 0.75, 0.9, 0.95 and 0.99. Further,
as most empirical studies, I nd a positive non-linear impact of age on earnings. The
educational attainment of the individual also seems to matter. Thus, as compared
with those individuals with basic education, those with secondary education and
those with university studies obtain higher incomes.
Table 1.6 aims to provide further evidence on the e¤ect on earnings of dif-
ferent occupational choice decisions for unemployed individuals. In particular, I
estimate earnings equations using OLS and random e¤ects panel data models to
compare earnings for self and paid employed individuals entering from unemploy-
ment during their rst year as self or paid employed.7 The panel data structure of
the ECHP allows me to follow the same individuals during the observation window
(1994-2001). Thus, those who reported to be self-employed in t and unemployed
in t   1 were classied as self-employed coming from unemployment (UN ! SE),
6Some limitations arise from these methods. Perhaps, more importantly they do not correct for unob-
served heterogeneity. Toward this end, earning equations were also run by means of both random and xed
e¤ects estimations. These results (not reported for brevity) conrm that self-employed earn less relative
to paid employees. These models, however, are not exempt from limitations, either. First, these models do
not compare earnings in selected quantiles. Second, these models assume that all individuals are ex-ante
identical. There might be however heterogeneity in unobserved characteristics (i.e. workers would not be
ex-ante identical) that may a¤ect occupational choices.
7Fixed e¤ects panel data models cannot be applied given the relatively small data set in this exercise.
The same occurs in Table 7.
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whereas those who reported to be paid employed in t and unemployed in t  1 were
classied as paid employed coming from unemployment (UN ! PE).
Table 1.6. Annual log earnings of paid and self-employed workers entering from
unemployment
OLS RE
Independent variables (x) Coe¤. t-stat. Coe¤. t-stat.
Main predictor
UN ! SE (ref. UN ! PE) a -0.3560 -4.20*** -0.3691 -7.88***
Demographic characteristics
Age (years) 0.0148 0.95 0.0128 0.76
Age squared -0.0002 -0.95 -0.0002 -0.75
Basic education a (ref.)
Secondary education a 0.0119 0.32 0.0164 0.41
Tertiary education a 0.0636 1.34 0.0647 1.43
Constant 9.1123 27.87*** 9.1480 25.22***
Number of observations 1,184
Number of individuals 1,171
Notes:
(i) Standard errors are adjusted for intra-individual correlation when estimating by OLS.
(ii) Given the dependent variable is expressed in natural logarithms, these coe¢ cients e¤ects can
be interpreted as the percent change in earnings with respect to predicted earnings for sample
means in case of continuous variables. In the context of dummy variables, it reects the percent
change in earnings for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(iii) a Dummy variable
(iv) Business sector, country and time dummies are included in all regressions, although
coe¢ cients are not presented.
(v) *** denotes signicance at the 1% level; ** denotes signicance at the 5% level;
* denotes signicance at the 10% level.
The dependent variable is the annual log income for paid employed or self-
employed that come from unemployment. To ensure comparability, the same lters
applied in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 have been used (see footnote 6). Our main predictor
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(UN! SE) has a strong negative e¤ect meaning that those self-employed individuals
coming from unemployment earn, on average, 37 percent less than those unemployed
entering salaried work.8 It could be argued that some unemployed becoming self-
employed would probably prefer a job in paid employment but the lack of salaried
jobs may have pushedthem into self-employment.9
As regards our control variables, our results show marginally signicant dif-
ferences between those self or paid employed individuals (entering from unemploy-
ment) with tertiary education compared to those holding only primary education.
Table 1.7 aims to compare earnings of self-employed depending on whether
they entered from unemployment or paid employment. Thus, those who reported to
be self-employed in t; t 1; : : : ; t i+1 and unemployed in t i for some i 2 f1; : : : ; 6g
were classied as self-employed coming from unemployment (UN ! SE), whereas
those who reported to be self-employed in t; t   1; : : : ; t   i + 1 and paid employee
in t   i for some i 2 f1; : : : ; 6g were classied as self-employed coming from paid
employment (PE ! SE). I am interested in individuals that remained in the same
business during the period t; : : : ; t   i + 1. Therefore, in order to be classied as
UN ! SE or PE ! SE, I also impose that the individual reports that the year he
started his job (as self-employed) was the same for every t; : : : ; t   i + 1.10 I also
make use of both OLS and random e¤ects panel data models where the dependent
variable is the annual log income for self-employed that come from unemployment
8Quantile regressions were also used as a robustness check. These results show how earnings of those
unemployed entering self-employment are only higher than earnings of those entering paid employment
from percentile 0.9 onwards. Hence, for the subsample of those previously unemployed, di¤erences in
earnings in favor of self-employed seem to be more pronounced.
9An alternative explanation might be the fact that some time can be needed until a business generates
substantial prots and, hence, earnings can be low the rst years operating a business. However, salaries
are also more likely to be low during rst years. In this vein, we estimated complementary regression to
observe evolution of earnings for both self and paid employees during their rst 4 years within the same
business or salaried job position. Our results indicate that, 4 years after starting, earnings of self and
paid employed increases by about 28% and 9.5%, respectively. In other words, we observe some degree
of convergence in earnings for both groups but di¤erences in favor of paid employees are still noticeable.
These estimations are not presented for brevity and are available upon request.
10Actually, the year that the individual started working should be t  i+ 1.
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or paid employment.
Table 1.7. Annual log earnings of self-employed workers entering from unemployment
or paid employment
OLS RE
Independent variables (x) Coe¤. t-stat. Coe¤. t-stat.
Main predictor
UN ! SE (ref. PE ! SE) a -0.2052 -2.44** -0.1866 -2.01**
Demographic characteristics
Age (years) -0.0077 -0.17 0.0152 0.30
Age squared 0.0001 0.19 -0.0002 -0.29
Basic education a (ref.)
Secondary education a -0.0412 -0.46 0.0087 0.10
Tertiary education a -0.1117 -0.95 -0.0243 -0.22
Duration dependence
Job tenure as self-employed (years) 0.1212 3.84*** 0.1184 3.55***
Constant 8.0887 6.40*** 7.3265 6.15***
Number of observations 988
Number of individuals 491
Notes:
(i) Standard errors are adjusted for intra-individual correlation when estimating by OLS.
(ii) Given the dependent variable is expressed in natural logarithms, these coe¢ cients e¤ects can
be interpreted as the percent change in earnings with respect to predicted earnings for sample
means in case of continuous variables. In the context of dummy variables, it reects the percent
change in earnings for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(iii) a Dummy variable.
(iv) Business sector, country and time dummies are included in all regressions, although
coe¢ cients are no tpresented.
(v) *** denotes signicance at the 1% level; ** denotes signicance at the 5% level;
* denotes signicance at the 10% level.
It can be observed that self-employed incomes are about 19% lower for those
entering from unemployment, as compared to those who started from paid employ-
ment. This may reect that unemployed workers that become self-employed have a
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lower reservation wage than the one of those entering from paid employment.11 In
other words, unemployed individuals might be willing to start up even if expected
prots are low (i.e. necessity based decision) whereas paid employees would enter
self-employment if expected prots are su¢ ciently high (i.e. opportunity based de-
cision). Finally, we observe as each additional year of experience as self-employed
increase earnings by about 12% whereas we do not identify any signicant e¤ect of
formal education.
1.3 The model
1.3.1 Model description
In this section I present the basic environment. There is a continuum of risk-neutral
and innite-lived workers. All workers are ex ante identical. The measure of workers
is normalized to one. Workers discount time at rate :
At any point in time a worker can be in one of three distinct states: un-
employed, paid employed or self-employed. Unemployed individuals enjoy some
ow utility b (typically including the value of leisure and unemployment insurance
benets). Job o¤ers arrive randomly at rate i; i 2 fun; pe; seg ; where un; pe
and se denote unemployment, paid employment and self-employment respectively.
Therefore, I allow those job o¤er arrivals rates to be di¤erent for unemployed, paid
employed and self-employed workers. When an o¤er arrives, the individual has the
option of accepting a wage w which is randomly drawn from the known and xed
distribution FPE(w). A paid employed worker loses her job with probability pe:
To become self-employed, workers rst need to have a business idea. Busi-
ness ideas arrive randomly at rate  i; i 2 fun; pe; seg. Thus, also business ideas
11As robustness, quantile regressions were also used. As expected, earnings for those entering from paid
employment are higher for all percentiles.
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arrive at a di¤erent rate to unemployed, paid employed and self-employed workers.
Each idea has associated a self-employment income x which is randomly drawn from
the known and xed distribution FSE(x). The self-employed have their business fail-
ing for exogenous reasons at rate se:
Let U be the value of being unemployed. U satises the following Bellman
equation:
U = b+ unEw

max

V PE(w); U
	
+
(1.1)
+unEx

max

V SE(x); U
	
+ (1  un   un)U
Where V PE(w) is the value of a paid employed worker with wage w and V SE(x)
the value of a self-employed worker with income x. Unemployed workers receive
ow utility b. At rate un they receive a job o¤er. They will accept the job o¤er
if the expected value is greater than the value of unemployment. Analogously, an
unemployed worker will receive a business idea at rate un. They will implement
that idea if the expected value is greater than the value of unemployment. If they
receive neither a job o¤er nor a business idea, they will remain unemployed next
period.
The value function of a paid employed worker with wage w is given below:
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V PE(w) = w + peEw0
h
max
n
V PE(w
0
); V PE(w)
oi
+
+peEx

max

V SE(x); V PE(w)
	
+ (1.2)
+peU + (1  pe   pe   pe)V PE(w)
Paid employed workers receive wage w. They can receive another job o¤er while
paid employed at rate pe that they will accept if the expected value is greater than
the value of paid employment with wage w. Paid employed workers receive business
ideas at rate pe. They lose their job with probability pe: If they receive neither
another job o¤er nor a business idea nor a job destruction shock, they will remain
paid employed with wage w next period.
The value function of a self-employed worker with income x is:
V SE(x) = x+ seEw

max

V PE(w); V SE(x)
	
+seEx0
h
max
n
V SE(x
0
); V SE(x)
oi
(1.3)
+seU + (1  se   se   se)V SE(x)
Self employed workers receive income x. They receive a job-o¤er at rate se.
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They will accept this job o¤er if the expected value is greater than the value of
self-employment with income x. Self-employed workers can receive another business
idea which arrives at rate se. The self-employed have their business destroyed with
probability se: If they receive neither a job o¤er nor another business idea nor a
job destruction shock, they will remain self-employed with income x next period.
1.3.2 Steady state
In steady-state, the value functions U; V PE(w); V SE(x) solve (1), (2) and (3) for
every w in the support of the wage distribution and every x in the support of the
self-employment income distribution. Those policies imply distributions of wages
across paid employed ~FPE(w) and income across self-employed ~FSE(x): Given those
policy values, also unemployment, paid employment and self-employment rates can
be derived as well as transition probabilities between those three states. Next I
will dene the reservation wages and incomes.12 Let wRun, be the reservation wage
for which the worker is indi¤erent between remaining unemployed and becoming
paid-employed. Analogously, let xRun be the reservation productivity for which the
worker is indi¤erent between remaining unemployed and becoming self-employed:
U = V PE(wRun) = V
SE(xRun)
I will also dene xRpe(w) as the reservation income that makes the worker in-
di¤erent between being paid employed at wage w and self-employed with income
xRpe(w):
12 I checked numericaly that V PE(w); V SE(x) are increasing in w and x respectively (see gure 1.1
below).
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V SE(xRpe(w)) = V
PE(w)
Similarly, let wRse(x) be the reservation wage for which the worker is indi¤erent
between being self-employed with productivity x and paid employed with wage
wRse(x):
V PE(wRse(x)) = V
SE(x)
Let un, pe and se be the unemployment, paid employment and self-employment
rates. Since the measure of workers is normalised to one, un = 1  pe  se. Workers
ow from unemployment to paid employment at rate un(1   FPE(wRun)), which is
equal to the product of the job o¤er arrival rate and the probability that a randomly
generated o¤er exceeds the reservation wage wRun: They ow from unemployment to
self-employment at rate un(1  FSE(xRun)) that is equal to the product of the ideas
arrival rate and the probability that the randomly generated income associated to
an idea exceeds the reservation income xRun. Workers ow from paid employment
and self-employment to unemployment at the exogenous rates pe and se. In steady
state, outow equals inow:
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
un(1  FPE(wRun)) + un(1  FSE(xRun))

un =
(1.4)
= pepe+ sese
By analogous reasoning, the ow of unemployed workers who obtain a job in paid
employment paying w or less is un(FPE(w)   FPE(wRun))un. The ow of the self-
employed accepting a job payingw or less is sese
x¯Z
x
¯

FPE(w)  FPE(wRse(x))

1(V PE(w) >
V SE(x))d ~FSE(x); where x¯
and x¯ are the lower and upper support of the income dis-
tribution across self-employed. Because the paid employed only ow from lower-
to higher-paying jobs, the sum of both is the total ow into the set of the paid
employed with wage w or less. The ow out of this subset of paid employed workers
is the ow of those who lose their jobs, equal to pe ~F (w)pe plus the ow of those
who enter self-employment, plus the ow of those who nd jobs in paid employment
paying more than w. In steady state, the ow into the subset of the paid employed
with wages w or less equals the ow out of this subset:
un(FPE(w)  FPE(wRun))un+ sese
x¯Z
x
¯

FPE(w)  FPE(wRse(x))

1(V PE(w) > V SE(x))d ~FSE(x) =
(1.5)
=
24pe ~FPE(w) + pe(1  FPE(w)) ~FPE(w) + pe wZ
w
¯
(1  FSE(xRpe(w))d ~FPE(w)
35 pe
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where w
¯
is the lower support of the wage o¤er distribution Analogously, the
inow and outow in the subset of the self-employed with income x or less equals:
un(FSE(x)  FSE(xRun))un+ pepe
w¯Z
w
¯

FSE(x)  FSE(xRse(w))

1(V SE(x) > V PE(w))d ~FPE(w) =
(1.6)24se ~FSE(x) + se xZ
x
¯
(1  FPE(wRse(x)))d ~FSE(x) + se(1  FSE(x)) ~FSE(x)
35 se =
where w is the upper support of the wage o¤er distribution
1.4 Calibration
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, it is simulated numerically. The data
used in the estimation is based on the ECHP which was described in section 2. Euro-
pean countries vary in their labor market policies. In particular, in their protection
against uninsurable labor market risk (like unemployment benets or employment
protection legislation, which protects workers against ring). Those policies are
likely to a¤ect the transitions between the states of unemployment, paid employ-
ment and self-employment as well as the earnings distributions. For the calibration,
I choose a group of homogeneous countries in terms of unemployment policies. This
is the group of the Continental countries (Austria, Belgium, France and Germany).
Table A1 illustrates the unemployment replacement rates and duration for these
countries. It can be observed that the unemployment insurance in those countries
is, on average, similar. Table A2 shows how there are not big di¤erences between
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them in terms of employment protection. Further, it can be observed from table A3
that the employment rates, with the exception of Belgium, are not very di¤erent.
I choose the wage o¤er distribution FPE and the self-employment income
distribution FSE to be log normal, so that log(w)  N(PE; 2PE) and log(x) 
N(SE; 
2
SE).
13 I set the time period to be one quarter, which is lower than the
frequency of the employment data I use because typical job nding rates are higher.
The data used to compute some of the targets have annual frequency, and I aggregate
the model appropriately when matching those targets. The discount rate is set so
that the implied yearly interest rate is 3 percent and hence  = 0:9925. The rest
of the parameters are set to match some moments in the data. Several data targets
are chosen and the log squared distance between them and the equivalent statistics
produced in the benchmark model economy is minimized with respect to those
parameters. The parameters left to be set are:
 Unemployeds ow utility: [b], 1 parameter;
 Job and business destruction rates [pe; se], 2 parameters;
 Arrival rates of job o¤ers [un, pe, se], 3 parameters;
 Arrival rates of business ideas [un, pe, se], 3 parameters;
 Coe¢ cients of the log normal distribution functions for paid employment wages
and self-employment income [pe, pe, se, se], 4 parameters.
I choose the values for those 13 parameters to pin down the following mo-
ments generated by the model:
 The unemployment and paid employment rates (2 targets),
13Log normality is a reasonable assumption about the realized distribution of wages observed in the
data.
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 The annual transition probabilities (6 targets):
1. from paid employment to unemployment
2. from self-employment to unemployment
3. from unemployment to paid employment
4. from unemployment to self-employment
5. from paid employment to self-employment
6. from self-employment to paid employment
 The transition probabilities (2 targets):
1. from self-employment to paid employment after 2 years without interrup-
tion in self-employment
2. from paid employment to self-employment after 2 years without interrup-
tion in paid employment.
 The mean and standard deviation of the residuals from Mincer equations for
paid and self-employed (4 targets).
 The di¤erence between the means of the residual from Mincer earnings equa-
tions for paid employment wages and self-employment income of workers com-
ing from unemployment (1 target).
I use the residuals from the earnings distributions because workers are ho-
mogeneous in the model. I estimate the equation ln zit = 0 + controls+ "it where
z is equal to the wage if the individual declares to be paid-employed and is equal to
self-employment income if the individual declares to be self-employed. I control for
age, education, sector, country and waves. Then I calculate the mean and standard
deviation of the residuals "it for both paid and self-employed.14
14For the last target, I calculate the mean of the residuals "it from the previous regression for paid and
self-employed coming from unemployment and take the di¤erence.
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With the 6 independent transitions (between UN, PE and SE), the fraction
of people in unemployment, paid employment and self-employment would be deter-
mined in steady state. In reality, the economy is not in steady state. The transition
rates are estimated with error and thus, the stocks will not be consistent with the
transition rates (when applying the steady-state equations). Therefore, the stocks
contain useful information about past transition behavior, so they help to pin down
the transition matrix more precisely.
I choose these moments because I would like the model to capture the earn-
ings and transitions observed in the data. The last moment is chosen so that the
model captures the self-employed earning less than the paid-employed when coming
from unemployment. As observed in section 1.2, it is a salient feature that the self-
employed coming from unemployment are in worse shape than the paid employed
coming from unemployment. Intuitively, the moments for the rates and the tran-
sition probabilities contain information about the parameters for the job and ideas
arrival rates and the destruction rates. The moments on the transition probabilities
between paid employment and self-employment after 2 consecutive years, together
with the same annual transition rates, are used to learn about the arrival rate of job
o¤ers to paid employed (pe), and the arrival rate of ideas to self-employed (se).
They capture how quickly the transition from self-employment to paid employment
(resp. from PE to SE) declines with time spent in self-employment (resp. in PE).
And thus, these statistics indirectly capture how fast the paid employed move up
the job ladder and the self-employed move up the SE ladder. The earnings residuals
are closely related to the parameters of the coe¢ cients of the income distributions.
The performance of the model in matching calibration targets is described
in Table 1.8.
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Table 1.8. Matching the moments
Moment Value
Data Model
av log inc PE 0.035 0.002
sd log inc PE 0.394 0.551
av log inc SE -0.271 -0.242
sd log inc SE 1.072 1.020
av. log. inc UN!PE av. log. inc. UN!SE 0.632 0.678
Unemployment rate 0.071 0.058
Paid employment rate 0.845 0.827
Transition prob. UN!PE 0.298 0.290
Transition prob. UN!SE 0.022 0.023
Transition prob. PE!SE 0.006 0.006
Transition prob. SE!PE 0.048 0.045
Transition prob. PE!UN 0.024 0.021
Transition prob. SE!UN 0.009 0.008
Transition prob. PE!SE (2 years) 0.031 0.042
Transition prob. SE!PE (2 years) 0.006 0.006
The economic environment presented and estimated above generates an economy
which closely follows certain labor features of the Continental countries. However,
the average income in paid employment is slightly too low and the average income
in self-employment is slightly too high. Calibrated parameter values can be found
in Table 1.9. The values for the calibrated parameters imply that the self-employed
receive both job o¤ers and business ideas with a much higher frequency than the
unemployed and the paid employed. In addition, the failure rate is lower for the
self-employed as compared with the paid-employed. As a consequence, the option
values of the self-employed are high compared to the ones of the paid-employed.
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Table 1.9. Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
b 0:000
pe 0:006 se 0:002
un 0:301 un 0:007
pe 0:216 pe 0:004
se 0:965 se 0:023
pe  1:845 se  1:443
pe 0:877 se 0:925
The value U; and the value functions V PE(w) and V SE(x) are plotted in gure
1 as a function of w and x: The value functions for the paid and the self employed
are increasing in w and x respectively. The value of being self-employed is always
higher than the value of being unemployed. That is, V SE(x) > U for every possible
x in the support. It can be observed how for the same level of earnings, the value
of being self-employed is higher than the value of being paid employed. That is,
V SE(z) > V PE(z) for all z: It can also be observed from gure 1.1 that there exists
some wage wL such that the paid employed with wages w < wL, will implement
any idea they receive.15 Therefore, both the unemployed and the paid employed
with low wages will implement any business idea they receive. The self-employed
with low incomes wait until they draw a high wage in paid employment or a better
self-employment idea. They do not accept low wages in paid-employment because
next period, if they remain self-employed, they will receive another job o¤er with
a high probability. Therefore, the earnings of the self-employed are lower than the
earnings of the paid employed. The values of the coe¢ cients of the log normal
distributions imply a larger variance on the self-employment income distribution
FSE(x) than in the paid employment wage distribution FPE(w). The self-employed
in the upper tail of the equilibrium income distribution have been lucky enough
15 If w < wL; then V SE(x) > V PE(w) for all x:
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to get a good business idea. The self-employed with high incomes often come from
another business because the arrival rate of ideas for the self-employed is higher than
the one for the paid employed. On the other hand, as previously discussed, those
in the lower tail of the realized self-employment income distribution accepted those
ideas because of the better option values of self-employment. All this can explain
the larger variance on the self-employment income distribution compared with the
paid employment wage distribution.
Figure 1.1. Value functions
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The parameter value of the job arrival rate when self-employed se is particularly
high. This is in part due to the high transition rate from self-employment to paid-
employment in the data. Also, this is necessary to make self-employment more
valuable than paid-employment and thus, to explain the mean earnings in paid and
self-employment.
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Table 1.10. E¤ects of a decrease in the arrival rate of job o¤ers when self-employed se
se 0:965 0.550
av log inc PE 0.002 -0.044
sd log inc PE 0.551 0.542
av log inc SE -0.242 -0.114
sd log inc SE 1.020 0.924
av. log. inc UN!PE av. log. inc. UN!SE 0.678 0.652
Unemployment rate 0.058 0.056
Paid employment rate 0.827 0.823
Transition prob. UN!PE 0.290 0.301
Transition prob. UN!SE 0.023 0.023
Transition prob. PE!SE 0.006 0.005
Transition prob. SE!PE 0.045 0.034
Transition prob. PE!UN 0.021 0.021
Transition prob. SE!UN 0.008 0.008
Transition prob. PE!SE (2 years) 0.031 0.033
Transition prob. SE!PE (2 years) 0.006 0.004
Table 1.10 compares the e¤ects of decreasing se from 0.965 to 0.550.16 When
se decreases, the transition rates from self-employment to paid-employment and
from paid employment to self-employment decrease. Also, the average earnings of
the paid employed decrease whereas the ones of the self-employed increase. Further,
standard deviations of both paid and self-employed decrease. Those e¤ects are
mainly a consequence of a decrease in the di¤erence between V SE and V PE for low
w and x.17
Figure 1.2 compares the e¤ect of decreasing se on reservation paid employment
wages for the self-employed as a function of their income wRse(x) and reservation
16For se > 0:220; still V SE > U: The value of se = 0:550 was chosen as an illustration. Instead, any
se 2 [0:220; 0:967] could have been chosen and the e¤ects would have been qualitatively the same.
17All else equal, the decrease in se imply worse option values for the self-employed and, consequently,
V SE decreases. Therefore, V SE(z)  V PE(z) becomes smaller.
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self-employment income for the paid employed as a function of their wages xRpe(w).
18
For low values of w and x; as se decreases, wRse(x) decreases while x
R
pe(w) increases.
Since wRse(x) decreases, the low-income self-employed accept more low-wage paid
employment. At the same time, the increase in xRpe(w) makes the paid employed
with lower earnings less likely to implement low-income self-employment ideas.19
Consequently, the mean wage of the paid employed would decrease whereas the
mean income of the self-employed would increase.20 For higher values of w and x
there is essentially no change. As it has been shown, a high value of se is necessary
to capture the earnings distributions as observed in the data.
Figure 1.2. E¤ects of decreasing se from 0.967 to 0.550 on wRse(x) and x
R
pe(w)
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1.5 Results
In order to better understand the mechanism of the model, I will study separately the
pattern of the self-employed with low incomes from those with high incomes. I will
show that the transition patterns are di¤erent for both groups. This is closely related
18Obviously, xRpe(w) and w
R
se(x) are simetric with respect to the 45
0 line.
19Also notice that wL decreases for a lower value of se. Thus, the number of paid employed that
implement any idea they receive also decreases.
20Again, for any se 2 [0:220; 0:967]; the e¤ects would be quantitatively the same.
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with the literature on "Necessity" and "Opportunity" self-employment. Since 2001,
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) has discussed two rather di¤erent
types of self-employed (see Reynolds et al., 2002). The di¤erentiation focuses on the
motivation of the entrepreneur to start his or her venture. On the one hand, those
who have chosen to be self-employed to take advantage of a market opportunity are
dened as opportunity self-employed. On the other hand, those who have chosen to
be self-employed by lack of salaried jobs are dened as necessity self-employed.21
I divide the self-employed into two groups: necessity self-employed and op-
portunity self-employed. I will use the following approach to identify those two
groups. I dene someone as necessity self-employed if he accepted the typical job
in paid employment. By typical, I take the median paid employed. Let wmed be
the wage of the median paid employed worker. Then, the threshold xNE is obtained
from the model satisfying the equation22:
V SE(xNE) = V PE(wmed) (1.7)
I dene the self-employed with incomes below xNE as necessity self-employed
and the self-employed with incomes above xNE as opportunity self-employed. Table
1.11 describes the transitions from unemployment and paid employment to necessity
and opportunity self-employment generated by the model. Table 1.12 contains the
transitions from necessity and opportunity self-employment to any other state. As
mentioned earlier, the model predicts that the transition pattern of those two groups
is quite di¤erent. In particular, necessity self-employment is a less stablegroup.
Most of the transitions from unemployment to self-employment are to necessity
21Opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs are dened by individuals answers to a survey question. Each
respondent was asked to indicate whether he was starting and growing his business to take advantage of
a unique market opportunity (opportunity entrepreneurship) or because it was the best option available
(necessity entrepreneurship).
22xNE is well dened since wmed > wL
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self-employment. Moreover, the majority of the self-employed who enter paid em-
ployment are the necessity self-employed. Therefore, they nd in self-employment
a good route to nd a paid employment job. By contrast, the transitions out of
opportunity self-employment are scarce. Thus, the mechanism of the model is the
following. Unemployed or paid employed with low wages choose self-employment
despite having low self-employment incomes because their option values in self-
employment are better than those in unemployment and in paid employment. They
stay in self-employment until they nd a better paid employment job. For them,
self-employment is a transitory state.
Table 1.11. Annual Transition Probabilities
to Necessity and Opportunity Self-employment
Status in t+1
Model Data
Status in t SENE SEOP SENE SEOP
UN 0.020 0.003 0:015 0:008
PE 0.004 0.001 0:003 0:002
Table 1.12. Annual Transition Probabilities from Necessity
and Opportunity Self-employment to Other States
Model
Status in t+1
Status in t UN PE SENE SEOP
SENE 0.008 0.091 0.889 0.012
SEOP 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.975
Data
Status in t UN PE SENE SEOP
SENE 0:006 0:141 0:615 0:237
SEOP 0:000 0:014 0:143 0:842
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 also describe the transitions between the four states of
unemployment, paid employment, necessity self-employment and opportunity self-
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employment observed from the data.23 Since I calibrated to the Mincer residuals, I
apply to the data the threshold xNE obtained in the model. In the data, I dene
someone who is self-employed as necessity self-employed if the Mincer residual is
less than log(xNE). In the contrary case, I dene this self-employed as opportunity
self-employed. By doing so, I can compare the results generated by the model with
the observations from the data. The transition pattern generated by the model is
conrmed by the data. Note that those transitions are not a target in the calibration.
The transitions that the model is not able to capture are those from necessity self-
employment to opportunity self-employment and from opportunity self-employment
to necessity self-employment. This can be expected for two reasons. First, in the
model the self-employed cannot go voluntarily from a higher to a lower income
in self-employment without a period of unemployment. Since the time period is
set quarterly, the few transitions from opportunity self-employment to necessity
self-employment correspond to opportunity self-employed that had their business
destroyed and entered necessity self-employment after some spell of unemployment.
Second, self-employment incomes presumably have high variation from one year
to the other making self-employment earnings uncertain. This uncertainty is not
present in the model since the self-employed will get at least the same income in
period t+1 as in period t if their business is not exogenously destroyed, i.e., if they
do not become unemployed. The failure of the model to capture these transitions
suggests that idiosyncratic uncertainty in self-employment incomes may then be
important to understand these transitions.
Figure 1.3 characterizes the transition pattern of the necessity self-employed.
23The sample used to construct tables 11 and 12 is slightly di¤erent from the sample used in the
calibration. It is necessary to take into account the self-employment income variable to di¤erentiate
between necessity and opportunity self-employed. Individuals declare their income corresponding to the
year prior to the survey. In order to strictly present yearly incomes, it is necessary to obseve the incomes in
t+1 and t+2 of the self-employed individuals in t and t+1 respectively. Therefore, individuals are followed
for 3 consecutive periods whereas they were only observed for 2 consecutive periods in the calibration.
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I start at t = 0 with the entire pool of the necessity self-employed, that are distrib-
uted according to ~FSE(x) with x below xNE: Panel (a) shows the percentage of
the necessity self-employed at t = 0 that have not transitioned to another state, as
a function of time.24 At t = 0 this percentage equals one. As it can be observed,
necessity self-employment is a transitory state. After one year (t = 4), about 11 per-
cent of the necessity self-employed moved to another state. Panels (b), (c) and (d)
show the percentage of the necessity self-employed at t = 0 who have made at least
one transition to unemployment, paid employment or opportunity self-employment
respectively as a function of time (I am not considering any event that happens after
this rst transition). At t = 0 this percentage equals zero. The results indicate that
most of the transitions out of necessity self-employment occur to paid employment.25
24Time period is equal to one quarter
25At every t; the four transition percentages sum up to one.
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Figure 1.3. Evolution of the Necessity Self-employed.
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(c). Transitions from Necessity Self-employment (d). Transitions from Necessity to Opportunity
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1.6 Comparative Statics
In this section, I evaluate the e¤ect of some policies encouraging self-employment.
In particular, I will intend to replicate the "Bridging Allowance" policy which is
a real policy that has been implemented in Germany since 1985. Unemployed
individuals who want to start their own business, are supported by the Bridg-
ing Allowance(BA, Überbrückungsgeld) programme (see Pfei¤er and Reize, 2000;
Caliendo, 2008). Its main goal is to cover basic costs of living and social security
contributions during the initial stage of self-employment. BA supports the rst 6
months of self-employment by providing the same amount as a recipient of a BA
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would have received if he or she had remained unemployed. (plus a lump sum to
cover social security contributions).
Following the BA, some start-up incentives are given to the unemployed
workers who enter self-employment. Those start-up incentives consist on certain
amount of money k that the self-employed coming from unemployment receive dur-
ing their rst period as self-employed. As in the BA policy, we will set k equal to 6
months of unemployment benets. Since the unemployment benets are not explic-
itly dened in the model26, I will consider them equal to 50% of the mean income of
a worker. In the benchmark case, the unemployment benets caused certain Gov-
ernment spendings To keep the Government spending constraint, the unemployment
benets will be changed accordingly (i.e. depending on how the unemployment rate
varies after implementing the policy, the unemployment benets will decrease or
increase).
Table 1.13 compares some moments generated by the model with and with-
out start-up incentives. It can be observed that the results with and without start-up
incentives are very similar. The transitions from unemployment to self-employment
and the unemployment and self-employment rates are practically unchanged. The
reason is that for a given level of earnings, the value of being self-employed is
very high and consequently, the unemployed would implement any business idea
they would receive. Therefore, these policy beneciaries would have entered self-
employment even without the start-ups incentives. In our model economy, the start-
up incentive policy has redistribution e¤ects. Compared with the benchmark case,
the amount of unemployment benets that the unemployed receive decrease. The re-
duction on unemployment benets compensates the spending on start-up incentives
26b which was dened as the ow income of unemployment, can be thought as b = b1 + b2, where b1 is
the monetary unemployment benet (paid by the government) and b2 is the leisure value (if positive) or
stigma and boredom (if negative).
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paid to the unemployed who enter self-employment. However, this redistribution
has small e¤ects in the unemployment and self-employment rates.27
The model presented here sheds doubt on the view that encouraging self-
employment will be benecial for growth. In this sense, more self-employment does
not necessarily mean more "entrepreneurship". Instead, it may put workers in a fair
less desirable situation where they are not very productive. More research is needed
to determine the e¤ects of these policies in the data.
Table 1.13. Moments generated by the model with and without start-up incentives.
Moment without start-up incent. with start-up incent.
av log inc PE 0.002 0.002
sd log inc PE 0.551 0.551
av log inc SE -0.242 -0.242
sd log inc SE 1.020 1.020
av. log. inc UN!PE av. log. inc. UN!SE 0.678 0.678
Unemployment rate 0.058 0.058
Paid employment rate 0.827 0.827
Transition prob. UN!PE 0.290 0.290
Transition prob. UN!SE 0.023 0.023
Transition prob. PE!SE 0.006 0.006
Transition prob. SE!PE 0.045 0.045
Transition prob. PE!UN 0.021 0.021
Transition prob. SE!UN 0.008 0.008
Transition prob. PE!SE (2 years) 0.042 0.042
Transition prob. SE!PE (2 years) 0.006 0.006
1.7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to build a model of self-employment with
frictions that quantitatively explains the unemployment, paid employment and self-
27 I plan to study what happenen in the data when such subsidies were given
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employment rates, the transitions between those states and the observed distribution
of earnings in self-employment and paid employment.
Toward this end, I rst show evidence indicating that many individuals
choose self-employment as a route out of unemployment. Among other regularities, I
document that (i) unemployed workers are more likely to enter self-employment than
paid employed workers are; (ii) self-employment sector does not pay well, on average,
as compared to paid employment; and (iii) those entering self-employment from
unemployment have lower earnings than those entering self-employment from paid
employment which gives support to the view of self-employed as the only available
alternative to unemployment for certain groups. These facts motivate extending the
existing theoretical works.
The model, once calibrated to the group of the Continental countries by
means of data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP; Eurostat),
captures the fact that the self-employed earn less and have larger earning variance
than the paid employed. It also predicts that self-employment is a temporary op-
tion for many workers. Thus, most of the self-employment with low incomes came
from unemployment. These individuals, despite having low earnings, enter self-
employment because their option values in self-employment are better than those
in unemployment. For those workers, self-employment is seen as a door to paid
employment. The model is then used to determine the e¤ects of some policies that
encourage self-employment.
The paper highlights the importance of considering unemployment when
studying the decision to enter self-employment. The analysis can be extended in
several directions. In the benchmark model self-employment income is not subject to
uncertainty. Therefore, the income of self-employed individuals that do not change
of job or business, will not change from one period to the other. It would be
45
interesting to study the e¤ect on individuals choices of allowing for variation in
the self-employment income. Another interesting extension would be to study the
transitions between unemployment, paid employment and self-employment over the
life cycle.
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1.8 Appendix
Table A1. Net unemployment replacement rates and duration.
Replacement Rate Duration
Austria 1st period 55% 30-52 weeks
2nd period 50% indenitea
Belgium 1st period 60% 1 year
2nd period 42-60%b indenite
France 1st period Max{40.4% + e11.34/day, 57.4%} 7-26 months
2nd period up to 461 euros/monthc 6 months (renewable)
Germany 1st period 60-67% 1 yeard
2nd period 53-57% indenite
Notes:
(i) aApplicants must be in serious need of nancial support, after taking the income of the partner and exemption
limits into account. After a period of six months the level of the income support depends on the length of time
for which the claimant previously received the unemployment benet.
(ii) bIf partner is earning, the benet is reduced to 35 per cent. This reduced amount is paid for three months only,
plus an additional three months for each year the worker had been in work before he became unemployed. After
that period, benets are further reduced to around e13 per day.
(iii) cIf monthly net income less than 605,60 euros, otherwise reduced accordingly.
(iv) dLonger for people 45 and over (up to 32 months depending on age).
Table A2. OECD Indicators on Employment Protection
Austria Belgium France Germany
Average 1994-2001 2.21 2.53 2.62 2.99
Note:This indicator is intended to measure the strictness of EPL and is scaled to
lie between 0 and 6, from less to more protected workers.
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Table A3. Employment rates (in %)
Austria Belgium France Germany
State
SE 7.14 12.14 8.98 7.57
PE 87.67 81.20 82.43 83.66
UN 5.18 6.66 8.59 8.77
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Chapter 2
How does employment protection
legislation inuence hiring and
ring decisions by the smallest
rms?
(joint with J. Millán, C. Román and A. van Stel)
Abstract. This paper examines the impact of employment protection legislation
(EPL) on hiring decisions by own-account workers and ring decisions by very small
rms (1-4 employees). Using data from the EU-15 countries, our results show that
the strictness of employment protection legislation is negatively related to both
these types of decisions, and hence, to labour mobility among the smallest rms.
This new evidence may be useful for governments aiming to create a more enabling
macro-environment for employment and productivity growth.
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2.1 Introduction
The global economy faces a threatening downward spiral as a result of the nancial
and economic crisis of 2008. In some European economies, the problem is strongly
exacerbated by a substantial increase in unemployment rates and a decrease in com-
petitiveness. Therefore, the challenge is not just to start and strengthen the eco-
nomic resurgence, but also to ensure this recovery is accompanied by employment
and productivity growth. In this respect, there is near consensus among academics
and policymakers that entrepreneurship is a major driver of economic growth, job
creation, and competitiveness in global markets. Consequently, any successful strat-
egy to get out of the jobs crisis should recognize entrepreneurship as a key element.1
There is a heated debate in Europe, however, about the role of labour market reg-
ulation (Millán et al., 2012; Román et al., 2011, 2013). On the one hand, strong
employment protection is good for employees as it protects their rights. Hence, in
environments with strong employment protection, the number of job dismissals is
likely to be lower. On the other hand, it may not be so good for unemployed indi-
viduals since the risk for entrepreneurs of hiring an employee is bigger: if it turns
out the new employee does not perform as well as expected, or if the rm is forced
to downsize due to external circumstances, the costs of dismissing the employee are
relatively high. This increased risk of hiring employees related to strong employment
protection may make entrepreneurs more cautious to take on employees. And in an
environment where the entrepreneurs risk of hiring people is higher, the number of
new jobs created is also likely to be lower. So, while strong employment protection
may be good for individuals having a job (the insiders), it may not be so good
for individuals looking for a job (the outsiders). This paradox is known as the
insider-outsider problem of employment protection (see Lindbeck and Snower, 2001
1The key role of entrepreneurship as a major driver of economic growth, job creation, and competitive-
ness in global markets has been well documented in academic publications (see Van Praag and Versloot,
2007 for a comprehensive survey) and policy reports (see, for instance, the new Europe 2020 strategy).
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for a survey).
Strict employment protection may thus lower the levels of both hiring and
ring of employees. This, in turn, may cause levels of labour mobility the move-
ment of workers between rms to be lower as well. As labour mobility between
rms is an important source of knowledge spillovers, and thereby of productivity
growth (Stephan, 1996; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Cooper, 2001; Power and Lund-
mark, 2004), the impact of Employment Protection Legislation (henceforth EPL)
on hiring and ring decisions is an important topic of investigation.2 In this paper
we empirically investigate if and to what extent strict EPL (i) prevents the hiring
of employees by own-account workers; and (ii) hampers the ring of employees by
employers of very small rms (1-4 employees). We focus on the smallest rm cate-
gory because EPL disproportionally a¤ects the smallest rms, as in these rms the
hiring and ring costs are bigger relative to total labour costs. In other words, small
rms su¤er a scale disadvantage when EPL is high. Moreover, in small rms there
is less exibility to accommodate a poorly performing worker towards a di¤erent
occupation within the rm (Parker, 2007, p. 704). Hence, the impact of EPL on
hiring and ring decisions, and hence on the level of labour mobility, is expected
to be especially strong for (very) small rms. In our empirical analysis, random
e¤ects logit models are applied to individual level data drawn from the European
Community Household Panel for the EU-15 countries. The individual level data
are complemented by a macro level indicator reecting the strictness of employment
protection, developed by OECD.
2Although a positive impact on productivity growth may be associated with lower employment levels
(as the same output can be produced with less workers), empirical evidence points in the opposite direction:
regions that achieve productivity growth often also achieve employment growth because the market volume
increases as a result of increased competitiveness (Fritsch, 2008).
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2.2 State of the art
The literature on the determinants of job creation by the self-employed remains
rather limited: see, for example, Carroll et al. (2000) and Mathur (2010) for the
US; Westhead and Cowling (1995), Burke et al. (2000, 2002, 2009), Cowling et al.
(2004) and Henley (2005) for the UK; and Congregado et al. (2010) for the EU-15.
As regards job dismissals by the group of employers, the literature only adopted
tangential approaches to the phenomenon by means of survival analysis: see, for
instance, Millán et al. (2013) for the EU-15. To the best of our knowledge, an
analysis of the impact of the strictness of employment protection on the individual
decisions of (i) own-account workers to hire employees; and (ii) employers to re
employees, does not exist to date. This is the research gap we are aiming to ll in
the current paper.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Data
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (henceforth ECHP)
covering the period 1994-2001.3 The ECHP, designed and coordinated by EURO-
STAT, is a standardised multi-purpose annual longitudinal survey carried out at the
level of the EU-15.4 Additional details on the ECHP data can be found in Peracchi
(2002).
2.3.2 Sample
Two di¤erent samples are used in this analysis where, as usual, persons younger than
18 and older than 65, workers in the agricultural industries and those individuals
3The ECHP data are used with the permission of Eurostat (contract ECHP/2006/09, held with the
Universidad de Huelva).
4France, Luxembourg and Sweden were excluded from our analysis because these countries presented
missing values for several relevant variables.
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working part-time are excluded. Our rst sample includes individuals who are own-
account workers for some particular period and then either change their labour
force status to employers employing between 1 and 4 employees or remain as own-
account workers at a later period. This dataset yields 8,380 observations (3,324
individuals) of which 1,201 (14.3%) refer to transitions to employer. Our second
sample includes individuals who are employers employing between 1 and 4 employees
for some particular period and then either change their labour force status to own-
account workers or remain as employers at a later period. This second dataset yields
6,912 observations (2,911 individuals) of which 945 (13.7%) refer to transitions to
own-account worker.5
2.3.3 Estimation methods
We use random e¤ects binary logit models that control for unobserved heterogeneity
across individuals. Models that control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries
are used as robustness checks (not shown for brevity, but available on request). Both
approaches yield similar results. Furthermore, both these approaches show no major
changes relative to simple pooled regressions (also not shown). This suggests that,
even if some unobserved heterogeneity may exist, it does not a¤ect our estimates.
2.3.4 Measures
2.3.4.1. Dependent variables (Data source: ECHP)
Transitions from own-account worker to employer (1-4 employees): The dependent
variable is a discrete variable that equals 1 for individuals who are own-account
workers in period t and become employers in a rm with 1-4 employees in period
5The exclusion of those employers employing more than 4 employees reduces the number of transitions
from own-account worker to employer with 133 observations. Similarly, the number of transitions from
employer to own-account worker is reduced with 149 observations. As a robustness check, we also estimated
our models using data of all employer sizes. Results are qualitatively the same as presented in Table 2,
and are available on request.
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t+1. Note that such a transition implies hiring of new employees. It equals 0 for
individuals who remain as own-account workers in periods t and t+1.
Transitions from employer (1-4 employees) to own-account worker: The depen-
dent variable is a discrete variable that equals 1 for individuals who are employers
in a rm of 1-4 employees in period t and become own-account workers in period
t+1. Note that such a transition may imply ring of employees. It equals 0 for
individuals who remain as employers in periods t and t+1.
2.3.4.2. Independent variables
Main explanatory variable: EPL (Data source: OECD Employment Database)
This indicator is intended to measure the strictness of EPL and is scaled to lie
between 0 and 6, from less to more protected workers. As dened by the OECD,
EPL refers to regulations about hiring (e.g., rules favouring disadvantaged groups,
conditions for using temporary or xed-term contracts, and training requirements)
and ring (e.g., redundancy procedures, mandated pre-notication periods and sev-
erance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals, and short-time work
schemes).
As an illustration, Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the EPL index for selected
countries with di¤erent levels of labour market stringency. On average for the coun-
tries in our data sample, the EPL-index slightly decreases over the period considered.
Furthermore, Table 2.1 summarizes the specic legislative changes associated with
the within-country variation of the EPL index in these countries. See OECD (1999,
2004) for additional details.
Control variables (Data source: ECHP)
The empirical models include some sets of explanatory variables at the indi-
vidual level that are known to inuence entrepreneurial performance: demographic
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characteristics, formal education, incomes, job characteristics and country dummies
(see Parker, 2009 and Millán et al., 2012 for overviews). The inclusion of country
dummies combined with the fact that our EPL-variable is time-dependent allows us
to pick out the e¤ect of an increase in EPL over time within the same country, as
opposed to capturing the impact of simple cross-country variations. To make sure
our EPL variable does not erroneouslycapture business cycle e¤ects (which also
relate to variations over time), we also incorporate a variable from ECHP labeled
household perception of economic climate.6
2.4 Results and discussion
Estimation results are presented in Table 2.2. We use the same estimation strategy
in both models by using three di¤erent specications. Our rst specication in-
cludes all but one control variables (demographic characteristics, formal education,
incomes and job characteristics) as predictors, and serves as our baseline model
(Baselines A and B). Our second specication then adds the OECD measure of
employment protection described in subsection 3.4.2 (Models 1A and 1B). Finally,
our third specication also incorporates the household perception of economic cli-
mate variable, and serves as a robustness check of our results (Models 2A and 2B).7
Each specication is presented in a two-column format. The rst column shows the
marginal e¤ects whereas t-statistics are presented in the second column.8
6This variable (i) equals 1 for households considering the present economic situation unfavourable
for making large purchases; (ii) equals 2 for households considering the present economic situation not
favourable but also not unfavourable for making large purchases; and (iii) equals 3 for households consid-
ering the present economic situation favourable for making large purchases. Hence, the expected e¤ect of
this variable on hiring (ring) decisions is positive (negative). We use perception data at the individual
level rather than business cycle indicators at the aggregate level, since it is the perception of the individ-
ual entrepreneur that ultimately inuences the decision to hire or re employees. Reassuringly though,
correlations between country averages derived from this variable and aggregate business cycle indicators
like the unemployment rate are high, signicant and in the expected direction.
7Since data for the household perception of the economic climate are not available for Germany, we will
use this variable only in a robustness test.
8The robustness of our t-statistics has been checked by re-estimating them from variance-covariance
matrices of the coe¢ cients obtained by bootstrapping.
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Figure 2.1. Evolution of the EPL index for selected countries 
 
Notes: Mean refers to the EU-15 countries in our sample (excluding France, Luxembourg and Sweden) 
Source: OECD Employment Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Legislative changes affecting EPL index for selected countries 
 
Country Year Reform description 
EPL 
index 
    
Belgium 1997 Restrictions on TWA were reduced and FTC were made renewable - 
 2000 
Tightening of rule concerning notice period and compensation in case of unjustified dismissal for blue-
collar workers 
+ 
    
Finland 1996 Notice period was halved for workers with tenure less than 1 year - 
 2001 The new employment contract act came into force reducing notice periods further - 
    
Italy 1997 Treu package on FTC widened the number of valid cases for the use of FTC  - 
 1998 TWA were permitted - 
 2000 
Reform of TWA 2000 extended the use of TWA and removed the restrictions concerning unskilled 
workers 
- 
 2001 Legislative Decree no. 368/2001 expanded valid cases for the use of FTC - 
    
Spain 1997 
Maximum compensation for unfair dismissal was reduced and some changes were made to the 
definition of fair dismissal 
- 
 2001 Law 12/2001 tightened the rules governing valid cases for the use of FTC + 
    
Notes: TWA (temporary work agencies); FTC (fixed-term contracts) 
Source: OECD (2004), Table 2.A2.6, pp. 119-120.  
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Table 2.2. Determinants of the transitions 
 
Transitions From own-account worker to employer From employer to own-account worker 
Model Baseline A Model 1A Model 2A Baseline B Model 1B Model 2B 
Predicted probability (y) 0.120 0.118 0.115 0.095 0.092 0.091 
Independent variables (x) dy / dx t-stat. dy / dx t-stat. dy / dx t-stat. dy / dx t-stat. dy / dx t-stat. dy / dx t-stat. 
                            
Employment protection                         
EPL index (0-6)   -0.068 -3.64 *** -0.072 -3.64 ***    -0.072 -4.12 *** -0.089 -4.65 *** 
                            
Business cycle                         
Household perception of economic climate 
(1-3) a     0.021 4.37 ***       0.002 0.41  
                            
Demographic characteristics                         
Female b -0.005 -0.61  -0.005 -0.56  -0.006 -0.67 0.016 1.66 * 0.016 1.70 * 0.020 1.98 ** 
Age (18-65) -0.001 -0.46  -0.001 -0.42  -0.001 -0.38 -0.003 -0.88   -0.003 -0.94   -0.003 -0.98  
Age (squared) -1.0E-06 -0.03  -2.6E-06 -0.07  -2.3E-06 -0.06 3.7E-05 1.00   3.8E-05 1.06   4.4E-05 1.14  
Cohabiting b 0.012 1.33  0.012 1.28  0.011 1.1 -0.011 -1.02   -0.011 -1.05   -0.010 -0.87  
Number of children under 14 -0.003 -0.60  -0.003 -0.62  -0.002 -0.54 -0.003 -0.79   -0.003 -0.69   -0.003 -0.56  
                            
Formal education                            
Basic education b (ref.)                            
Secondary education b 0.007 0.75  0.007 0.77  0.005 0.53 -0.011 -1.30   -0.013 -1.47   -0.013 -1.41  
Tertiary education b 0.021 1.89 * 0.020 1.84 * 0.018 1.62 -0.024 -2.56 ** -0.024 -2.61 *** -0.024 -2.52 ** 
                            
Incomes                            
Money left to save in the household b 0.022 2.68 *** 0.021 2.65 *** 0.017 2.01 ** -0.032 -4.28 *** -0.032 -4.31 *** -0.031 -3.94 *** 
                            
Job characteristics                            
Working hours 0.002 1.34  0.002 1.34  0.002 1.04 -0.004 -2.53 ** -0.004 -2.45 ** -0.005 -2.76 *** 
Working hours (squared) -1.9E-05 -1.20  -1.9E-05 -1.20  -1.6E-05 -1.01 2.8E-05 1.90 * 2.7E-05 1.86 * 3.3E-05 2.18 ** 
Job tenure -0.011 -4.00 *** -0.011 -3.91 *** -0.010 -3.31 *** -0.009 -3.11 *** -0.008 -2.94 *** -0.007 -2.29 ** 
Job tenure (squared) 0.001 4.64 *** 0.001 4.52 *** 0.001 3.93 *** 4.9E-04 3.04 *** 4.4E-04 2.82 *** 3.6E-04 2.22 ** 
Construction sector (ref.) b                            
Industrial sector b 0.001 0.09  0.001 0.10  0.004 0.32 -0.013 -1.10   -0.014 -1.13   -0.010 -0.75  
Services sector b -0.041 -3.30 *** -0.041 -3.28 *** -0.044 -3.43 *** -0.005 -0.48   -0.005 -0.48   -0.006 -0.54  
                   
No. observations (No. transitions) 8,380 (1,201) 8,380 (1,201) 7,903 (1,139) 6,912 (945) 6,912 (945) 6,305 (884) 
Log likelihood -3,290.5 -3,283.8 -3,087.4 -2,512.7 -2,504.2 -2,390.2 
Notes: Country dummies are included in all regressions. 
a The information for Germany was not collected in the ECHP. 
b Dummy variable. 
*  0.10 > p ≥ 0.05;  **  0.05 > p ≥ 0.01;  ***  p < 0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
By and large, results for the micro level control variables are in line with theoreti-
cal expectations. In particular, the impact of tertiary education and the households
income of own-account workers are consistently positively related to the probability
that own-account workers become employers. Similarly, the impact of tertiary edu-
cation and the households income of employers are consistently negatively related
to the probability that employers become own-account workers.
Regarding our indicator of the labour market regulations at place in a certain
country, rst, we nd a negative impact of EPL on the probability of switching from
own-account worker to employer. As the EPL variable is measured as an index,
interpretation of the marginal e¤ect is not straightforward. To provide an intuition
of the magnitude of the e¤ect, let us provide an illustration. For the twelve countries
in our data sample, the average di¤erence between the maximum and minimum value
(within one country) over the eight-year period under consideration (1994-2001) is
0.43. The marginal e¤ect in model 1A (0.068) implies that for a decrease of the
index with 0.43, the probability of hiring employees increases with about 2.9%-point.
Given that the predicted probability evaluated in the sample means is about 12%,
the impact of EPL may be considered substantial. As argued by Parker (2007),
EPL imposes sunk costs for self-employed workers who decide to take on employees
and our results suggest that this causes many own-account workers to refrain from
hiring employees. This result is also consistent with Van Stel et al. (2007) who
found that stricter EPL is negatively related to entrepreneurship rates across a
sample of 39 countries, and in particular with opportunity entrepreneurship, the
type of entrepreneurship that is more likely to employ personnel (compared with
necessity entrepreneurship).
Second, concerning ring decisions, the marginal e¤ect shown in model 1B (
0.072) implies that for a decrease in EPL of 0.43 (as above), the probability of
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switching from employer to own-account worker increases with about 3.1%-point.
As expected, lower employment protection increases the number of job dismissals.
Hence, for a realistic decrease in EPL as described above, hiring chances by own-
account workers increase by 2.9%-point while ring chances by employers increase
by 3.1%-point. These magnitudes may be considered economically relevant. We
cannot draw conclusions as to whether hiring or ring decisions dominate as a result
of lowering EPL, for two reasons. First, the di¤erence between the two e¤ects is not
statistically signicant. Second, we do not have information about hirings and rings
that may occur within the employer rm category employing 1-4 employees (as an
employer who initially employs, for instance, two employees, and then subsequently
hires or res one employee, will still be an employer in the next period).
So, although we cannot draw nal conclusions concerning the net employment
e¤ect of changes in EPL, it is clear from our empirical analysis that job turnover,
and hence the level of labour mobility, increases when EPL decreases: the impact
of EPL on both transition probabilities (from own-account worker to employer and
vice versa) is highly signicant and economically relevant, as demonstrated above.
Finally, when including the household perception of economic climate variable in
models 2A and 2B, this control variable has the expected positive impact on hiring
decisions, while the results for the impact of EPL remain qualitatively the same.9
Hence, we can safely interpret the coe¢ cient associated to EPL as actually capturing
the impact of policy-induced changes in EPL on hiring and ring decisions.
9The information about the household perception of economic climate for Germany was not collected
in the ECHP, which reduces our sample in models 2A and 2B (relative to 1A and 1B, respectively). As
a robustness check, models 1A and 1B were also estimated for these reduced samples (i.e., excluding
Germany) and results remained unaltered. Results of this robustness test are available on request.
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2.5 Conclusions
During deep recessions with big employment losses and decreases in competitiveness,
the appropriateness of measures that might lead to employment and productivity
growth is a highly relevant policy issue. Our empirical analysis shows that the
strictness of EPL is negatively related to the probability that own-account workers
take on employees and hence, become employers. On the other hand, we also nd
that strict EPL lowers the number of job dismissals. These results suggest the
existence of a trade-o¤ of higher EPL in terms of benets for those individuals
who have a job (the insiders) and those who dont (the outsiders). Although
employees are better o¤ in an environment of strict EPL (their rights are better
protected), unemployed individuals may actually nd it harder to nd a job in such
an environment as entrepreneurs face higher risks when employing personnel, and
hence will less often decide to hire employees.
Although we cannot make nal conclusions as to whether hiring or ring deci-
sions dominate as a result of lower EPL, what is clear from our analysis is that
lowering EPL is strongly associated with higher labour mobility among the smallest
of rms. And since labour mobility has been found to be an important source of
knowledge spillovers and productivity growth, (Stephan, 1996; Breschi and Lissoni,
2001; Cooper, 2001; Power and Lundmark, 2004), EPL seems to have a profound
impact on micro- and macro-economic outcomes. Therefore, governments may nd
the piece of evidence provided in the current paper useful when evaluating their
labour market regulations.
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Chapter 3
Unraveling the relationship
between the business cycle and
the own-account workers decision
to hire employees
(joint with J. Millán, C. Román and A. van Stel)
Abstract. We study the role of the business cycle in the individual decision of
own-account workers to hire employees. Using panel data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel for the EU-15 countries, we show that own-account workers
are less likely to hire employees during recessions. Next, we focus on identifying the
underlying mechanisms of this negative relationship, while bearing in mind that
liquidity constraints and unemployment are more common during recessions. First,
we observe how liquidity constraints reduce the probability of transitioning from
own-account worker to employer. Second, we nd that non-higher educated own-
account workers who were formerly unemployed are less likely to take on employees
compared to those who were formerly in paid employment. This lower likelihood
does however not seem to apply to formerly unemployed own-account workers who
enjoyed tertiary education. These results suggest that formal education and for-
mer work experience are important assets for own-account workers which increase
the probability that they create new jobs. This new evidence may be useful for
governments aiming to stimulate employment growth.
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3.1 Introduction
Due to the nancial and economic crisis of 2008, unemployment rates in Europe
are currently sky high. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in November
2012 was 10.7% for the EU-27 while it was as high as 11.8% for the euro area
(Eurostat 2013). Hence, there is a strong need for economies to create new jobs. An
important pool of potential job creators is formed by the own-account workers, i.e.
self-employed workers without personnel. Their share in the total labour force for
the EU-15 countries was 7.8% in 2008, with country rates varying between 2.8% in
Luxembourg and 14.3% in Italy (Van Stel et al. 2012).1 If a substantial minority of
own-account workers would hire just one employee, this would already bring down
unemployment considerably. Hence, an important route of stimulating employment
may be to persuade own-account workers to take on employees, i.e., to become
employer entrepreneurs. This route may be even more promising if one realises
that barriers to take on the rst employee are often higher than for the second
employee, for instance because own-account workers do not have experience yet with
employing personnel. Désiage et al. (2011) discuss the existence of a one-employee
threshold for rms with no employees which they link to the cost of managing a
rst employee and to legal constraints, such as the restrictions on layo¤s. Once an
entrepreneur has experience with running a business with personnel (e.g. experience
with nancial planning to pay a salary every month, experience with administrative
burdens associated with employing personnel, etc.), the step to employing more
personnel may well be smaller. Indeed, using French data, Désiage et al. (2011)
nd that the probability for non-employers to hire a rst employee is lower than the
probability for employers to hire additional employees.
In this paper we study the determinants of the own-account workers decision
1These numbers refer to the private sector excluding own-account workers in agriculture, hunting,
forestry and shing.
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to hire employees, by which they become an employer. In doing so, we focus on
two phenomena which are more prevalent during economic downturns such as the
current one: liquidity constraints and unemployment. First, we investigate if and
to what extent hiring of personnel by own-account workers is impeded by liquid-
ity constraints. Second, we investigate if and to what extent the previous labour
force status of own-account workers plays a role in their decision to take on em-
ployees. In particular, we concentrate on whether an individual was unemployed
or paid-employed prior to becoming own-account worker, the latter status (paid
employment) revealing the possession of former work experience. We also exam-
ine whether formal education moderates the relation between previous labour force
status and the probability that an own-account worker hires employees.
Considering the previous labour force status of own-account workers as a possible
determinant of hiring decisions by these own-account workers has a clear link with
employment policy. A well-known policy instrument intended to combat unemploy-
ment is to stimulate unemployed individuals to become self-employed, for instance
by means of start-up incentive programs (Kluve and Card 2007; Shane 2009; Román
et al. 2013).2 Most individuals becoming self-employed by taking part in such a pro-
gram will initially become own-account worker (rather than employer entrepreneur).
Although the e¤ectiveness of start-up incentive programs is often debated (Santarelli
and Vivarelli 2007; Shane 2009; Román et al. 2013), there are also studies pointing
at a certain degree of success of such programs (Millán et al. 2012). What at least
seems to be clear though is that, if such programs are to be used, there is a need
to be selective regarding admission to such programs, in particular when unemploy-
ment is high.3 It would not be wise to admit each and every applicant to start-up
2This policy instrument is also emphasised in the recent Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan of the Eu-
ropean Commission: Given the signicant number of unemployed people across Europe, entrepreneurship
support schemes should be put in place to encourage business creation as a route out of unemployment
(European Commission, 2013, pp. 25-26).
3The need for selectivity is also recognised by the European Commission as they mention that support
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incentive programs, for two reasons. First, the amount of public money spent would
become very high, and second, it may lead to an abundance of self-employed which
make economies less e¢ cient, thereby hampering economic growth (Carree et al.
2002; Van Stel et al. 2012). Instead, it seems wiser to select applicants on the basis
of their probability of transitioning from own-account worker to employer, at least
when the policy target is job creation (rather than subsistence). In this regard, the
roles of formal education and former work experience are considered in the current
paper.
As mentioned, in the current paper we investigate determinants of transitions
from own-account worker to employer, while concentrating on the roles of liquidity
constraints and unemployment, both of which phenomena are more prevalent during
recessions. When examining these transitions, binary logit models are applied to
individual level data drawn from the European Community Household Panel for the
EU-15 countries. The set-up of this paper is as follows. Sections 2 to 5 respectively
discuss earlier literature, empirical methods, estimation results, and, nally, the
conclusions of the paper.
3.2 Brief literature review
Although the literatures on liquidity constraints and unemployment or business cycle
e¤ects for entrepreneurs are huge (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Evans and Jovanovic
1989; and Hurst and Lusardi 2004, as examples of inuential studies dealing with
liquidity constraints for entrepreneurs, and Parker 2011, for an overview of inuential
studies dealing with the relation between entrepreneurship and the business cycle,
including studies concentrating on unemployment), the literature on the specic
impact of these phenomena on job creation by own-account workers is limited. In
should be targeted at groups with the greatest potential, including unemployed workers with professional
skills and competences (European Commission, 2013, p. 26).
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fact, the literature on the determinants of job creation by the self-employed is limited
anyway: studies that do consider this topic include Carroll et al. (2000), Davis et al.
(2009) and Mathur (2010) for the US; Westhead and Cowling (1995), Burke et al.
(2000, 2002, 2009), Cowling et al. (2004) and Henley (2005) for the UK; Désiage et
al. (2011) for France, and Congregado et al. (2010) and Millán et al. (2011, 2012) for
the EU-15. To the best of our knowledge, an analysis of the underlying mechanisms
of the negative relationship between the business cycle and the individual decision
of own-account workers to hire employees does not exist to date. This is the research
gap we are aiming to ll in the current paper.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Data
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (henceforth ECHP)
covering the period 1994-2001.4 The ECHP is a standardised multi-purpose an-
nual longitudinal survey carried out at the level of the EU-15.5 It was designed
and coordinated by the Statistical O¢ ce of the European Communities (Eurostat).
The target population of the ECHP consists of people living in private households
in the national territory of each country. This panel o¤ers information on 60,500
nationally representative households, which includes approximately 130,000 indi-
viduals aged 16 years and older. One of its attractive features is the high level of
comparability across countries and over time. Thus, using the same questionnaire,
all members of the selected households in the participating countries are interviewed
about issues relating to demographics, labour market characteristics, income, and
living conditions. Additional details on the ECHP data can be found in Peracchi
4The ECHP data are used with the permission of Eurostat (contract ECHP/2006/09, held with the
Universidad de Huelva).
5France, Luxembourg and Sweden were excluded from our analysis because these countries presented
missing values for several relevant variables.
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(2002).
3.3.2 Sample
Conditional on self-classication, the ECHP allows both categories within self-
employment (i.e., own-account worker and employer) to be separately identied
by combining the information included in two separate questions: the individuals
in our dataset were asked about (i) their main activity status (paid employment,
self-employment, unpaid work in a family enterprise, education/training, unemploy-
ment or inactivity) and (ii) the number of regular paid employees in the local unit of
their current job. Thus, those self-employed with 0 employees are considered own-
account workers, and those self-employed with 1 or more employees are classied as
employers.
Our sample includes men and women aged 18 to 65 who are own-account work-
ers for some particular period and then either change their labour force status to
employers or remain as own-account workers at a later period. Workers in the agri-
cultural industries are excluded from the analysis due to the structural di¤erences
from the rest of the economy. Finally, all individuals working under 15 hours per
week are also excluded.6 The nal dataset, after removing cases with missing data
for any of the relevant variables, yields 8,491 observations, of which 1,325 (15.6%)
refer to transitions to employer.
3.3.3 Estimation methods
In order to provide a framework for the empirical analysis, we use random e¤ects
binary logit models that control for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals
(Wooldridge 2002). Unobserved heterogeneity is a concern because if the factors
6The information about the number of regular paid employees in the local unit, which enables the
distinction between employers and own-account workers, is only available for those individuals working 15
or more hours per week.
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that are not explicitly included in the model are correlated with those included,
the estimated e¤ects of the latter may be biased. In particular, there may exist
some individual-specic heterogeneity, for example, because individuals di¤er in
their intrinsic ability. This ability, not being observed in the data, may a¤ect hiring
decisions made by individuals, and therefore the results obtained for the variables
included in the regression might partially reect the e¤ect of this ability. While we
cannot observe ability, we can model the presence of this unobserved heterogeneity
assuming the presence of an individual-specic random e¤ect. We will report the
results following this approach, which show no major changes relative to simple
pooled regressions (not shown for brevity, but available on request), thus suggesting
that, even if some unobserved heterogeneity may exist, this does not a¤ect our
estimates.
3.3.4 Measures
The following variables are used in our analysis. A detailed denition of all our vari-
ables and some descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively
(see Appendix).
3.3.4.1. Dependent variable (Data source: ECHP)
The dependent variable is a discrete variable that equals 1 for individuals who are
own-account workers in period t and become employers in the same rm in period
t+1. It equals 0 for individuals who remain as own-account workers in the same
rm in periods t and t+1. We take this last group as the reference category.7
7 Individuals who are own-account worker in period t can also enter a di¤erent rm in period t+1 either
as employer or own-account worker. Accounting for these observations would increase our data set by 909
observations, of which 168 (18.5%) refer to transitions to employer in a di¤erent rm. However, we consider
that this is not an advisable strategy because these individuals could be as much successful entrepreneurs
(discovering and exploiting better business opportunities) as failed entrepreneurs (who discover that their
business opportunity is not as protable as they expected and simply try again). This heterogeneous
composition would make the results non-interpretable.
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3.3.4.2. Main explanatory variables (Data source: OECD and ECHP)
3.3.4.2.1. Direct e¤ect Business cycle: The role of the business cycle is captured
by means of variables at the macro and micro level. At the macro level, we use GDP
growth rates (source: OECD Economic Projections) in order to capture the state of
the various national economies in the period under study.8 At the micro level, we
use the reported households general feeling about the present economic situation.9
3.3.4.2.2. Indirect e¤ects: 1st and 2nd mechanism Liquidity constraints: We
also aim to capture the role of liquidity constraints by means of variables at both
the macro and micro level. At the macro level, we use national GDP per capita
(source: OECD National Accounts) which may be seen as a measure of economic
development. At the micro level, we include home ownership in an attempt to mea-
sure family assets, and the occurrence of money left to save considering households
income and expenses.10
Starting status: The ECHP o¤ers information on whether the individual entered
the current labour force spell from unemployment, as compared to other previous
labour force statuses which we include in our analysis. Furthermore, we include an
interaction term capturing the possibly di¤erential e¤ects of entering own-account
work from unemployment for individuals with higher and lower levels of educa-
tion. Finally, we also include a wider set of variables accounting for the role of
previous labour force status: unemployment, inactivity, paid employment and self-
employment at a di¤erent rm. By doing so, only those individuals that started
their current own-account work spell during the sample period are actually included
8We have obtained similar results by considering national unemployment and employment growth rates
and national output gaps (OECD) as alternative measures of macroeconomic conditions.
9Unfortunately, this information was not collected for Germany in the ECHP which leads us to exclude
this country from the specic part of our analysis which uses this variable.
10We obtained similar results when using other proxies at the micro level: relative earnings compared
to last years level and the ability to make ends meet.
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in our sample.11
3.3.4.3. Control variables (Data source: ECHP)
The empirical models include a set of explanatory variables at the individual (micro)
level that are known to inuence entrepreneurial performance (see Parker 2009, and
Millán et al. 2012, for overviews): demographic characteristics (gender, age, marital
status and number of children), formal education, employment characteristics (hours
of work, experience and business sector) and country dummies, the latter accounting
for structural di¤erences between countries which possibly a¤ect the probability of
hiring employees.
3.4 Results and discussion
Estimation results are presented in Table 3.1 by using eight di¤erent specications.
Our baseline model includes all control variables. Models I and II are used to test
the direct e¤ect of the business cycle on the transitions from own-account worker
to employer. Models III and IV are used to capture the role of liquidity constraints
(indirect e¤ect: 1st mechanism). Finally, the role of previous labour force status
(indirect e¤ect: 2nd mechanism) is analysed in Models V, VI and VII. Each speci-
cation is presented in a two-column format. The rst column shows the marginal
e¤ects, but expressed in relative terms (with respect to predicted probabilities for
sample means) whereas t-statistics associated with these marginal e¤ects are pre-
sented in the second column.12
11As a consequence, Germany and The Netherlands are excluded from our analysis when using these
variables.
12The robustness of our t-statistics has been checked by re-estimating them from variance-covariance
matrices of the coe¢ cients obtained by bootstrapping.
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3.4.1 Main results
We nd that economic growth has a clear positive impact on the likelihood of enter-
ing employership from own-account work. In particular, we observe that the proba-
bility of hiring employees increases by about 32.6% when GDP growth rates increase
by one percentage point (see Table 3.1, Model I). We also obtain a positive cyclical
e¤ect on transitions from own-account worker to employer when using the reported
households general feeling about the present economic situation. Our results show
that the predicted probability of switching from own-account self-employment to
employer increases by 17.3% when this variable increases by one unit (on a discrete
1-2-3 scale) (see Table 3.1, Model II). Hence, the impact of the households general
feeling about the present economic situation may be considered substantial. These
results, which use both a micro level and a macro level indicator of the business
cycle, support the importance of expansionary periods for recruiting personnel or,
in other words, our results show that own-account workers are less likely to hire
employees during recessions.
Next, we try to identify the underlying mechanisms of the negative relationship
between the business cycle and the probability of own-account workers to take on
employees. We rst analyze the role of liquidity constraints (also captured by means
of both micro and macro proxies), which are more likely during recessions. At the
macro level, we observe that transitions to employer increase by about 46% with
each additional 1,000 PPP US$ of 1990 increase in GDP per capita (see Table 3.1,
Model III). As regards our micro level variables, both home ownership and the
occurrence of money left to save (considering a households income and expenses)
also have a positive e¤ect on transitions. Thus, the probability of switching to
employer increases by 19.5% when own-account workers are home owners and by
14.6% when there is money left to save in the household (see Table 3.1, Model
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IV). In this regard, home ownership might be important for entrepreneurs who
require outside labour because a house is often used as collateral when an individual
applies for a loan from a bank. Results from Models III and IV both point at the
importance of liquidity for expanding the business with outside labour. Therefore,
the implementation of policies that increase access to credit for self-employed in
economic downturns, particularly for the smallest SMEs, seems to be of paramount
importance as a way to increase job-creation and hence combat unemployment.13
As providing small loans is often not e¢ cient for banks, and access to bank loans
is therefore often denied to these smallest rms (Cressy 1996, 2000; Levenson and
Willard 2000; Freel 2007), there seems to be a clear role for policy intervention.
Second, we examine whether entering own-account work from unemployment (as
compared to other previous labour force statuses, the most common one being paid
employment) inuences transitions to employership. From a policy point of view the
answer to this question is relevant since own-account work entries from unemploy-
ment are more likely during recessions (Román et al. 2013). Our results show that
entering own-account work from unemployment decreases the probability of switch-
ing to employer by only 9%. In accordance with this small magnitude, the result is
not signicant (see Table 3.1, Model V). When we allow for a moderating e¤ect of
tertiary education (see Table 3.1, Model VI), results suggest that this non-signicant
negative e¤ect of entering own-account work from unemployment on job creation is
the net result of two opposite e¤ects of this variable for the groups of own-account
workers with and without higher education. For the latter group, i.e., for non-higher
educated own-account workers, the probability of switching to employer decreases
by about 14% for those who were formerly unemployed, as compared to those start-
ing from other statuses, i.e. mainly paid-employment. This e¤ect is signicant at
13Note that own-account workers who take on employees will almost always still belong to the smallest
rm category.
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5% level. For own-account workers with tertiary education, however, we obtain a
non-signicant positive e¤ect of entering from unemployment as compared to other
prior statuses.14 Stated otherwise, higher education seems to remove the negative
e¤ect of starting own-account work from unemployment on later hiring decisions.
The policy implications are quite direct, in the light of these results. Thus, start-up
incentives and higher education policies should be considered in tandem with each
other if governments want to promote a type of self-employment that contributes to
the job generation process.
As a renement of Models V and VI, we also include a wider set of variables
accounting for the role of previous labour force status. As argued in subsection
3.4.2.2, only those individuals who started their current own-account work spell
during the sample period are included in this particular sample. This reduces our
dataset to 1,573 observations, of which 303 (19.3%) refer to transitions to employer.
The advantage is that we can make a distinction between starting statuses other
than unemployment, i.e. we know whether the own-account workers were formerly
unemployed, inactive, paid-employed or entrepreneur in a di¤erent rm. When
doing so, we obtain that the probability of switching to employer for those who
entered own-account work from paid employment increases by 33.7% as compared
to those entering from unemployment (see Table 3.1, Model VII). This result seems
to emphasise the importance of former work experience obtained as a paid employee.
Apparently, own-account workers are more likely to take on employees if they have
formerly worked as an employee themselves.
14The probability of switching to employer increases by (28.4% - 14.3% > 0) for this group. This e¤ect
is not signicant though as its p-value is 0.174.
72
73 
 
Table 3.1. Transitions from own-account work to employer 
 
  Direct Effect Indirect effect: 1st mechanism Indirect effect: 2nd mechanism 
 Baseline Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
Predicted probability (y) 0.1338 0.1279 0.1253 0.1199 0.1194 0.1338 0.1337 0.1778 
Independent variables (x) %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. %
y
dx/dy
 
t-stat. 
             
Business cycle                 
GDP growth rate (%)    32.6 10.57 *** 29.2 9.17 ***           
General feeling about present 
economic situation (1-3) a     17.3 4.34 ***           
                         
Liquidity constraints                 
GDP per capita ('000)       45.9 12.76 *** 45.4 12.6 ***       
Dwelling owner b         19.5 2.76 ***       
Money left to save in the household b         14.6 2.09 **       
                         
Starting status (Models V-VI)                 
Other starting statuses b (ref.)                 
Unemployment b           -9.0 -1.43 -14.3 -2.07 **   
Unemployment x Tertiary education b             28.4 1.57   
                         
Starting status (Model VII)                 
Unemployment b (ref.)                 
Inactivity b               24.7 1.12 
Paid employment b               33.7 1.93 * 
Different firm b               9.9 0.61 
                         
Demographic characteristics                 
Female b -6.2 -0.97 -7.5 -1.14 -8.5 -1.22 -4.6 -0.64 -5.6 -0.77 -6.4 -1.00 -7.0 -1.09 -22.9 -1.81 * 
Age (18-65) -0.9 -0.37 -1.0 -0.42 -1.0 -0.37 0.2 0.08 0.4 0.16 -0.8 -0.35 -0.8 -0.32 6.6 1.36 
Age (squared) -0.004 -0.15 -0.002 -0.08 -0.002 -0.07 -0.021 -0.63 -0.024 -0.74 -0.005 -0.17 -0.006 -0.21 -0.102 -1.63 
Cohabiting b 13.1 1.80 * 13.1 1.74 * 13.0 1.64 12.8 1.57 12.7 1.55 13.1 1.80 * 13.0 1.78 * -1.9 -0.13 
Number of children under 14 -2.4 -0.73 -1.9 -0.56 -1.9 -0.52 -1.5 -0.40 -1.2 -0.33 -2.5 -0.75 -2.4 -0.73 -5.2 -0.72 
                         
Formal education                 
Basic education b (ref.)                 
Secondary education b 10.4 1.44 9.2 1.24 6.6 0.86 10.7 1.33 9.8 1.23 10.7 1.49 10.8 1.5 15.8 1.09 
Tertiary education b 26.2 2.96 *** 27.4 2.97 *** 26.1 2.68 *** 28.2 2.79 *** 26.2 2.59 *** 26.1 2.95 *** 18.5 1.92 * 55.1 2.73 *** 
                         
Job characteristics                 
Working hours 1.4 0.96 0.9 0.62 0.9 0.60 1.6 1.01 1.4 0.91 1.3 0.91 1.4 0.95 -2.3 -0.85 
Working hours (squared) -0.011 -0.89 -0.007 -0.53 -0.009 -0.65 -0.012 -0.88 -0.011 -0.78 -0.011 -0.85 -0.011 -0.89 0 025 1.08 
Job tenure -8.4 -3.93 *** -8.3 -3.74 *** -7.6 -3.29 *** -5.6 -2.35 ** -6.1 -2.52 ** -8.8 -4.06 *** -8.7 -4.03 *** -26.4 -1.73 * 
Job tenure (squared) 0.6 4.53 *** 0.5 4.26 *** 0.5 3.81 *** 0.4 2.75 *** 0.4 2.88 *** 0.6 4.62 *** 0.6 4.58 *** 3.9 1.62 
Construction sector b (ref.)                 
Industrial sector b -0.3 -0.03 -0.5 -0.04 1.7 0.14 1.2 0.10 1.4 0.11 -0.1 -0.01 0.04 0.01 2.7 0.13 
Services sector b -36.7 -3.76 *** -38.1 -3.72 *** -42.6 -3.91 *** -42.7 -3.75 *** -43.8 -3.82 *** -36.4 -3.73 *** -35.7 -3.66 *** -33.5 -1.85 * 
     
No. observations (No. transitions) 8,491 (1,325) 8,491 (1,325) 7,998 (1,247) 8,491 (1,325) 8,491 (1,325) 8,491 (1,325) 8,491 (1,325) 1,573 (303) 
Log pseudolikelihood -3,523.5 -3,464.8 -3,248.4 -3,430.6 -3,424.3 -3,522.5 -3,521.1 -734.7 
Notes: Country dummies are included in all regressions; *  0.1 > p ≥ 0.05;  **  0.05 > p ≥ 0.01;  ***  p < 0.01; a The information for Germany was not collected in the ECHP; b Dummy variable
3.4.2 Controls
As regards our results for the micro level control variables, rst, we nd a positive
relationship between higher education and the probability that own-account workers
expand their labour force. This e¤ect is quite strong. Furthermore, we nd a
non-linear, U-shaped, impact of job tenure on transitions to employer where the
turning point is reached when the length of the spell as own-account worker is
about 7.7 years (i.e., after 7.7 years the likelihood of employing personnel increases).
Finally, regarding the sector of economic activity, we observe that the probability of
becoming employer is lower for own-account workers in services sectors than it is for
those working in the industrial and construction sectors. This probably reects the
lower scale of operations in services sectors, so that it is quite possible to maintain
a business without employees. In manufacturing, on the contrary, economies of
scale are much more important so that the own-account worker status is almost by
denition a transitory stage (Van Stel et al. 2012).
Robustness checks
The validity of our results has been checked by performing a couple of robustness
checks. As regards the role of the business cycle, the results are independent of the
way macroeconomic conditions are included in the models, as indicated in footnote 8.
Concerning liquidity constraints, our results are robust to the inclusion of alternative
householdsincome measures, as indicated in footnote 10.
3.5 Conclusions
During deep recessions with big employment losses, the appropriateness of di¤erent
routes to stimulate employment growth is a highly relevant policy issue. In the
present paper, we study one such route, viz., the individual decision of own-account
workers to hire employees. We examine the determinants of this decision, while
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focusing particularly on determinants related to recessions. Using panel data from
the European Community Household Panel for the EU-15 countries, we show that
own-account workers are less likely to hire employees during recessions. Next, we
focus on identifying the underlying mechanisms of this negative relationship, while
bearing in mind that liquidity constraints and unemployment are more common
during recessions. First, we observe how liquidity constraints reduce the probability
of transitioning from own-account worker to employer. Second, we nd that non-
higher educated own-account workers who were formerly unemployed are less likely
to take on employees compared to those who were formerly in paid employment.
This lower likelihood does however not seem to apply to formerly unemployed own-
account workers who enjoyed tertiary education. These results suggest that formal
education and former work experience are important assets for own-account workers
which increase the probability that they create new jobs. This new evidence may
be useful for governments aiming to stimulate employment growth. In particular,
our results suggest that, in order to mitigate the negative consequences of recessions
on job creation by own-account workers, it is important to (i) facilitate access to
credit for the smallest SMEs, and (ii) consider formal education and former work
experience as possible admission criteria for individuals applying for participation
in start-up incentive programs.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.2. Variable description table
Variable Description
Dependent variable
Transitions from own-account Dependent variable equals 1 for individuals who are own-account worker in period t and become
work to employer employer in the same rm in period t+1. The variable equals 0 for individuals who remain as own-
account workers in the same rm in periods t and t+1. We take this last group as the reference
category.
Independent variables
Business cycle
GDP growth rate Real GDP growth rates (source: OECD Economic Projections).
General feeling about present Discrete variable equalling 1, 2 or 3; the scale refers to the households general feeling about the
economic situation present economic situation for making large purchases. This variable (i) equals 1 for households
considering the present economic situation is unfavourable for making large purchases; (ii) equals
2 for households considering the present economic situation not favourable but also not
unfavourable for making large purchases; and (iii) equals 3 for households considering the present
economic situation is favourable for making large purchases.
Liquidity constraints
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita expressed in thousands of PPP US$ of 1990 (source: OECD National
Accounts).
Dwelling owner Dummy equals 1 for households owning the dwelling.
Money left to save in the Dummy equals 1 for households able to save regularly some money considering households income
household and expenses.
Starting status (Models V-VI)
Other employment statuses Dummy equals 1 for individuals entering own-account work from other employment statuses such
as inactivity, paid employment or self-employment in a di¤erent rm.
Unemployment Dummy equals 1 for individuals entering own-account work from unemployment.
Starting status (Model VII)
Unemployment Dummy equals 1 for individuals entering own-account work from unemployment.
Inactivity Dummy equals 1 for individuals entering own-account work from inactivity
Paid employment Dummy equals 1 for individuals entering own-account work from paid employment
Di¤erent rm Dummy equals 1 for individuals entering own-account work from self-employment in a di¤erent
rm
Demographic characteristics
Female Dummy equals 1 for females.
Age Age reported by the individual.
Cohabiting Dummy equals 1 for cohabiting individuals.
Number of children under 14. Number of children younger than 14 living within the household
Formal education
Basic education Dummy equals 1 for individuals with less than second stage of secondary level education (ISCED-
1997, 0-2).
Secondary education Dummy equals 1 for individuals with second stage of secondary level education (ISCED-1997, 3).
Tertiary education Dummy equals 1 for individuals with recognized third level education (ISCED-1997, 5 or 6).
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Job characteristics
Working hours Hours of work per week.
Job tenure Number of years as own-account worker in present job.
Construction sector Dummy equals 1 for individuals whose code of main activity of the local unit of the business is F
(construction), by the Nomenclature of Economic Activities (NACE-93).
Industrial sector Dummy equals 1 for individuals whose codes of main activity of the local unit of the business are
C (mining and quarrying), D (manufactures) and E (electricity, gas and water supply), by the
Nomenclature of Economic Activities (NACE-93).
Services sector Dummy equals 1 for individuals whose codes of main activity of the local unit of the business are
G (wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household
goods), H (hotels and restaurants), I (transport, storage and communication), J (Financial
intermediation), K (real estate, renting and business activities), L (public administration and
defense; compulsory social security), M (education), N (health and social work) and O-Q (other
community, social and personal service activities; private households with employed persons;
extra-territorial organizations and bodies), by the Nomenclature of Economic Activities (NACE-93).
93).
Dummy equals 1 for individuals whose codes of main activity of the local unit of the business are
Country dummies 12 dummies equalling 1 for individuals living in the named country: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics
Model Baseline A Model 1A
No. observations/ transitions 7,166 1,325
Independent variables (x) Mean SD Mean SD
Business cycle
GDP growth rate (%) 3.51% 1.74 4.03% 1.92
Household perception of economic climate (1-3) a 1.72 0.76 1.85 0.76
Liquidity constraints
GDP per capita (PPP US$ of 1990) $13,621 3,981 $13,340 4,114
Dwelling owner b 76.8% 80.2%
Money left to save in the household b 35.4% 36.5%
Starting status
Unemployment b 28.0% 25.8%
Demograc characteristics
Female b 29.8% 27.0%
Age (18-65) 39.8 9.5 38.6 9.2
Cohabiting b 78.4% 78.5%
Number of children under 14 0.72 0.94 0.76 0.95
Formal education
Basic education b 49.2% 42.9%
Secondary education b 30.7% 34.5%
Tertiary education b 20.1% 22.6%
Job characteristics
Working hours 51.0 12.9 51.2 12.5
Job tenure 6.8 4.5 6.8 4.8
Construction sector b 12.8% 15.2%
Industrial sector b 10.4% 14.3%
Services sector b 76.8% 70.4%
Notes: a The information for Germany was not collected in the ECHP; b Dummy variable
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